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The Im plications of Option Pricing Theory on United Kingdom 
Development Policy: Thesis Abstract
Keith Cerny
Investment policy makers have consistently sought to promote inward 
investment through investment incentives of various kinds (e.g. capital 
grants, depreciation allowances). In applying these instruments, 
governments seek to influence companies as they apply a traditional 
investment decision making approach known as Net Present Value (NPV) 
analysis. Each of the government investment incentives influences some 
aspect of the NPV calculation.
Relatively recent research by McDonald Siegel (1986) has shown that for 
certain classes of investments, the NPV approach is inaccurate, often by a 
factor of two or more. This is because the NPV approach neglects the value of 
the option gained when a company chooses not to invest; by waiting a year or 
more, a company gains insight into macroeconomic and industry factors. If a 
company chooses to invest today, it must be sure that the return is sufficient 
to justify giving up the value of this additional information.
The value of this option can be quantified, based upon the underlying 
volatility and trend of the investment, and the com pany's cost of capital. This 
research creates an explicit linkage between traditional NPV analysis and the 
option valuation approach, before considering a whole new set of policy 
instruments designed to increase a company's likelihood to invest. The 
research develops several potential new instruments, screens them for the 
desired behaviour, and selects the most promising instrument. The new 
instrument is then validated by using an investment case example adapted 
from the public dom ain and a large computer model.
The research also discusses several related areas. It describes the effect of 
overlaying Poisson type events on an investment decision (i.e. a sudden shift 
in the value of the investment), and draws the implications of this thinking on 
the policy approaches that should be taken by incum bent and opposition 
regional policy makers. Lastly, the research includes a review of the U.K.'s 
regional policy objectives and an analysis of different approaches to corporate 
investment decision making.
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C hapter 1 
A pplication  o f Option Pricing  
Techniques to  U nited  K ingdom  
Inward Investm ent Policy
1.1 O verview of the research
Many developed and developing countries suffer from a “regional 
problem” : a part of the country with significantly lower levels of economic 
development, overall wealth and attractiveness to investors. The existence 
of these regions tends to be self reinforcing, as a cycle of general neglect, 
government underinvestment (e.g., in infrastructure) and limited corporate 
investment sets in. As a result, nearly every government has both national 
and regional pohcies intended to break this negative cycle (see for example 
Yuill et al, 1980- for a comprehensive description of European approaches).
Some of these policies are intended to address aspects of the “social safety 
not” (e.g., improving the level of unemployment benefits or job training 
skills). Other policies include investment incentives, infrastructure building 
programmes, government purchasing schemes and a wide range of other 
types of intervention.
While the approaches taken to resolving regional problems vary greatly, 
both across countries and regions, and over time, Dicken and Tickell (1992) 
have noted that “the promotion of inward investment runs like a continuous 
thread through the ‘changing fads, fashions, and ideologies’ (Robinson, 
1990) of regional and local economic development pohcies.” This 
investment promotion often takes the form of policy instruments designed 
to improve the short term attractiveness of a given investment to potential 
investor companies. The companies on their part then apply a number of 
well understood techniques to evaluate the relative attractiveness of 
potential investments in different locations, both within a country and 
between countries. They can then decide whether or not to invest, and 
where to invest.
In making these assessments, potential corporate investors rely heavily 
upon calculations of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the expected future 
cash flows from a given investment.^ Having determined the discounted 
value of these cash flows, they then compare the value with the initial 
investment cost, taking into account any subsidies or other incentives from
^Chapter 4 gives a brief description of this analytical approach.
development agencies. The traditional approach is to invest in a given 
project if the present value V  exceeds the initial investinent cost / ,  having 
incorporated a suitable discount rate into V. The ratio of j  will be denoted 
as the critical ratio, C*. In the traditional approach, then, the decision rule 
is for a company to invest if C* > 1.
Relatively recent research (McDonald and Siegel, 1986), however, has 
shown that this approach is not sufficient, because it neglects the value of 
the additional information that will be received if the decision to invest is 
maxie in the future.^ For example, if a company waits before making its 
investment, it will learn additional information about the market, such as 
factor cost levels (e.g. labour rates) and macroeconomic information (e.g. 
inflation rates). The value of this additional information can be 
considerable. McDonald and Siegel have discovered that for reasonable 
economic parameters, it will be appropriate for a company to invest when 
V is 2 or more times the size of / ,  i.e. a C* of 2.
This starthng result is not widely known, even among sophisticated 
corporate investors and government policy makers. Most investment pohcy 
instruments are directed either at reducing the size of I  (e.g. through 
equipment subsidies, provision of rent free facifities) or at increasing the 
value of V  (e.g. through preferential tax or depreciation rates). Both of 
these approaches improve the likehhood of a company making an 
investment under the traditional decision making approach. These
^Appendix A describes their analysis in detail.
instruments can also have some impact on C* in the McDonald Siegel 
approach. Mathematical research has shown, however, that the volatility  
of inputs to V  (e.g. labor cost, exchange rates), as opposed to absolute 
level, can also be an important driver of C*. Thus it is possible to consider 
a whole new set of pohcy instruments designed to increase a company’s 
likehhood to invest, based exclusively on reducing uncertainty about the 
future. For example, a government might agree to assume the risk of 
fluctuations in labour costs to reduce the uncertainty about the future, 
thereby reducing both the amount of direct subsidy required to encourage 
immediate investment and the average time to investment.
The overall objective of this research, therefore, is to develop and assess a 
new set of pohcy instruments designed to stimulate investment, and to 
identify recommendations for investment policy makers based upon this 
work. In particular, I have developed an inteUectual bridge between a body 
of theoretical economics and typical approaches companies use to make 
investments; developed a detailed case example and computer model to 
impl«nent the new approach; and identified and screened several potential 
new policy instruments using this case example and model. This analysis 
therefore builds on existing academic work in economics and corporate 
finance, but apphes the concepts in a new way to inward investment policy. 
The new potential policy instruments described here are apphcable to both 
inward investment (i.e. by overseas companies) and local investment, and 
therefore both aspects will be discussed. The thrust of the research, 
however, is focused on inward investment policy. Note that for the purposes
of this thesis, the terms Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy and inward 
investment policy are considered to be interchangeable.
This research draws upon insights from a number of different fields 
(Figure 1.1). Hilhorst (1990) has noted that “regional studies as a field 
originated in various interrelated concerns and disciphnes.” Thus this work 
ra.r> be considered a logical extension of the interdisciplinary character of 
the field. The analysis relies upon several key mathematical concepts from 
stochastic calculus (i.e., the mathematical treatment of the behaviour of 
uncertainty) and option theory. It also draws on economics, corporate 
finance and theories of corporate decision making to identify how 
companies currently make investment decisions and how they should do so 
in hght of the mathematical treatment of uncertainty. Most importantly, 
the research draws upon key aspects of development policy, including 
objectives of inward investment pohcy and the relative emphasis the 
government places on different types of national pohcy instruments.
1.2 R ationale for study o f the U .K .
The U.K. represents an excellent country to study in the application of a 
distinctively new pohcy approach to a Western democracy. As Yuill (1980) 
has noted, “Regional pohcy in Britain has a much longer history than in 
the remaining Community countries and has encompassed a greater variety 
of pohcy measures than any other regional package in the Community. 
These measures include the service industry-grant scheme, the factory
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building programme and the now defunct Industrial Development 
Certificate programme (but while operational, one of the few effective 
location controls in the Community). As further evidence of the U.K.’s 
policy leadership role, especially in Northern Europe, Bachtler and Michie 
(1993) note that in the early 1980s, Britain was one of the first countries to 
reduce the geographic spread of assisted areas, prompting a number of 
countries to launch similar initiatives.
A second reason for studying the U.K. is the evidence that investment 
promotion has a significant impact on companies’ decisions to invest. This 
finding makes the U.K. environment a logical one to study in the 
application of new policy approaches. For example, the 1992 Japan 
External Trade Organization found that aggressive invitation from 
investment promotion was the third most important factor out of 15 for 
companies selecting the U.K. as their investment base (behind only the fact 
that the U K, speWcs English and the quality of the transportation, 
communication and other infrastructure).
The third reason for selecting the U.K. is the substantial resources that 
are maxie available for investment subsidies in the U.K.. Martin (1993) has 
estimated that the level of assistance was approximately i?400 million in 
1993, in just the Scottish Enterprise (formerly the Scottish Development 
Agency) and the Welsh Development Agency combined. Metcalf (1984) 
estimated that total expenditure on industrial support was £12.1 billion in 
1980, a full 6 % of GDP. This broke down into four categories: investment
8
incentives {£6 billion), support for particular sectors (i?3.1 billion), 
research and development (i^2.4 billion) and manpower subsidies {£1.2 
billion). Clearly this is an important area for study, given the magnitude of 
these numbers.
1.3 N ew  aspects of the research
The research presented here adds to existing thinking in seven main areas:
•  Identifying broad themes from sixty years of U.K. regional policy 
(Chapter 2).
• Providing a general framework to assess a country’s attractiveness for 
investors (Chapter 3).
• Linking the McDonald Siegel research to traditional firm decision 
making approach^, and developing a substamtial computer model to 
implement this linkage (Chapters 4 and 5). .
• Identifying a comprehensive set of potential policy levers and 
designing policy instruments baised upon them (Chapter 6).
•  Analysing these instruments to determine whether or not they 
motivate the desired investment behaviour, and - where relevant - 
assessing their costs and benefits (Chapter 6).
• Applying the most promising policy instruments to a detailed case 
example (Chapter 6).
Identifying the implications of the analysis for U.K. investment policy 
(Chapter 7).
1.4 Overall structure o f the research and  
m ethodology
This thesis is in six additional chapters, as follows:
t Chapter 2 sets out the general elements of regional policy, and 
arrays the U.K.’s current policy objectives against them. It also 
describes and evaluates a number of existing policy instruments, and 
identifies additional areas in which option theory could be applied to 
policy setting (e.g. infrastructure building). The chapter draws upon 
a number of different secondary sources and a few primary sources to 
describe five eras of U.K. regional policy.
• Chapter 3 develops a general framework to assess a country’s 
attractiveness for investment, and applies this framework to the U.K. 
The chapter also provides an overview of plant location decision 
making approaches, both rational and behavioural. The chapter relies 
upon literature research as well as interviews and discussions with 
corporate decision makers and government investment policy makers.
• Chapter 4 begins with a brief review of traditional Net Present 
Value analysis (the primary tool used by companies to make 
investment decisions). It then develops a five step process to link the
10
McDonald and Siegel approaxdi to traditional firm investment decision 
making. In terms of sources, this chapter draws upon the original 
McDonald and Siegel analysis and standard investment making tools 
as described in Brealey and Myers (1991).
• C h ap te r 5 describes the primary case example used in the thesis. 
The case is based upon detailed field work and analysis conducted by 
myself and a colleague (Cerny and Bartmess, 1992), although 
disguised for confidentiality^ and modified to correspond to a 
greenfield investment decision in the U.K. This chapter also describes 
in detail the model used to test the new policy instruments.
• C h ap te r 6 forms the core of the analysis. Based upon the 
mathematics described in Appendix A, it systematically describes and 
analyses four possible types of policy instruments. Of the four, two 
encourage the reverse of the intended behaviour (as seen in the 
following section, this type of counter-intuitive result is relatively 
common in this field). Of the remaining two approaches, one provides 
a practical new policy instrument, and this instrument is described 
and analysed in detail. The other remaining approach validates some 
research findings on the impact of policy divergence between 
incumbent and opposition political pairties, and provides fresh insights 
into policy approaches (especially policy pronouncements) by both 
parties.
®The methodological implications of this step are discussed in more detail in Section 
5.1.1.
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•  C h ap te r 7 summarizes the methodology and results of the thesis, 
and distils the implications for U.K. development. It concludes with a 
few insights on the implications of the analysis for corporate 
investment decision making. The chapter draws upon some published 
research to set the recommendations in a broader context.
$ Several appendices describe the underlying mathematics in detail,
■ summarize the author’s interviews and provide a sample of the 
detailed output from the investment model.
1.5 R elated work in developm ent policy
The analytical techniques described and applied here are based upon 
work by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and further described in Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). Direct apphcation of these ideas to develop specific policy 
instruments is original work, to the best of the author s knowledge.
The research in this thesis links to four aspects of existing research:
• Amplification of impact of uncertainty. Several authors have 
noted that relatively small amounts of uncertainty can have a major 
impact on a company’s likelihood to invest. Rodrik (1990) has 
developed econometric model that assesses the impact of 
uncertainty regarding the longevity of economic reforms for both 
small and leirge policy reversals. In his model, and using typical 
figures, companies require a significant investment subsidy to offset
12
even a 10 % probability of reversal. For small reversals, companies 
require a premium over alternative investments which is 80 % of the 
initial policy benefit, even with a probability of reversal of only 10 %. 
My own work supports this amplification phenomenon, and will be 
discussed further in case 8 of Section 6.4.3.
C oun terin tu itive  results. Max:Kie-Mason (1990) has analyzed the 
effects of nonlinear tax rates, and has discovered that some of the 
economic incentives applied to mineral extraction (e.g. the percentage 
depletion allowance) may actually have the reverse effect of what is 
intended once the interaction between tax rates and economic 
uncertainty is included. In axidition, increasing the corporate cash 
flow tax may actually increase a company’s likelihood to invest, once 
the interaction with the percentage depletion allowcince is taken into 
account. The existence of these types of counterintuitive results is 
reflected in my research. As is described later in more detail, two 
apparently “reasonable” policy instruments (one of which is in 
common use) actually reduce a company’s likelihood to invest if they 
are analyzed properly (See Sections 6.1 and 6.3.2).
A sym m etries. Majd and Myers (1986) have explored tax 
asymmetries (i.e. in government policy differences as applied to 
corporate losses vs. profits) by combining option pricing theory with 
Monte Carlo simulation. They conclude that these asymmetries can 
have a substantial impact on the net present values of investment 
projects. Although my research relates primarily to symmetrical
13
investment incentives, the important issue of bankruptcy on the cost 
of providing the key new,policy instrument is discussed in Section  
6.2.3. In this case, the existence of the asymmetry works in favour of 
the government, by reducing the average cost of subsidizing 
investment and therefore affecting a company’s likelihood to invest.
• Impact of policy uncertainty and divergence on investm ent.
Aizenman and Marion (1991) have attempted to link GDP growth to 
policy uncertainty for 46 developing countries. In general, they find 
that the correlation is typically negative (the expected result), but 
there are also cases where the correlation is positive or nonexistent. 
Given the highly macroeconomic nature of their analysis, it is not 
surprising that there are some exceptions to the overall pattern. They 
have also developed an economic model in which policy can fluctuate 
between a high-tax and low-tax state. If policy fluctuates randomly 
between the two states, then the degree of uncertainty between the 
two states (i.e. the divergence) has no impact on investment 
behaviour unless the policies are persistent (i.e. have a greater than 
50 % chance of being retained). If they are persistent, then more 
uncertainty does alter the pattern of investment. They also conclude 
that small divergences in policy have a limited impact on investment. 
My research is based on a single event model (i.e. the possibility of a 
single shift between policy regimes), emd agrees with one of their key 
findings: it shows that wide divergence between policy regimes has a 
strongly depressive effect on investment when the country is in the
14
less attractive regime (see, for example. Figure 6.6). While this result 
appears intuitively clear, it is important to verify it quantitatively, 
especially given the possibility for counterintuitive results noted 
above.
Some of the papers cited here will be discussed in more depth in the 
relevant sections.
1.6 L im itations o f the analysis and 
potentia l for further work
Given the potential breadth of application of option pricing theory to 
investment policy, this thesis has focused on defining and analysing a 
potential set of policy instruments, applying them where appropriate to a 
particular investment decision, and identifying the implications for U.K. 
pohcy. It addresses only briefly the question of whether stimulation of 
inward investment is an economic good, but rather focuses on how resources 
should be applied to achieve the maximum impact. As a further mechanism 
to reduce the scope of the analysis to a manageable level, this research:
• Focuses on investm ent incentives as the primary instrument to 
encourage inward investment. It excludes detailed analysis of other 
potential approaches to stimulate inward investment (e.g. 
infrastructure development, geographic distribution of government 
orders). The emphasis here is also upon efficient apphcation of
15
government resources to stimulate inward investment, not whether 
the goal itself is appropriate (although reference is nrade to  this issue  
in Section 2.2).
• Focuses on m anufacturing investm ent. There ctre, in fact, three 
main categories of regional poUcy analysis: manufacturing firms, 
service firms and agriculture. This thesis focuses exclusively on 
manufacturing firms, although the principles could be appfied to 
service firms as well. Work by Conway (1988) on private investment in 
the Turkish economy between 1962 and 1986, as discussed in Rodrik 
(1991), notes that the impact of policy uncertainty on investment is 
greatest by far in the manufacturing sector. This finding suggests 
that my emphasis on the manufacturing sector is appropriate.
• Assum es th e  investing company is able to  delay investm ent.
The analysis pres«ited here assumes that the investing company is 
able to delay the investment, at least for a period of time, without 
losing too many of the benefits (e.g. from pre-emptive competitive 
activity). Pindyck (1991) has noted that this is not always the case; 
however, he remarks that in most cas%, delay is at least feasible.
• Em phasises greenfield investm ents over plant relocations. The 
instruments developed and discussed in this document have been 
applied to greenfield investments. The underlying methodology could 
easily be extended to plant relocations, however.
16
• Has some specific technical lim itations in. the application of the 
McDonald Siegel work:
-  Irreversib ility  of investm ent. The model used in this analysis 
assumes that the investment is irreversible, i.e. once made the 
investment cannot be recovered. Pindyck (1991) notes two 
reasons for an investment to be irreversible. First, the capital 
may be firm or industry specific, making it difficult or impossible 
to redeploy the resources economically. Second, there is the 
“lemons problem”: some new equipment such as computers, cars 
and office equipment has resale value below its purchase price, 
even when virtually brand new. This makes investments at least 
partially irreversible. It is possible to imagine circumstances, 
however, where the investments are at least partially reversible, 
and it would be possible in principle to extend the McDonald 
Siegel analysis to these cases.
-  A ssum ption th a t  key variables follow geom etric 
B row nian m otion w ith drift. This constraint could be 
relaxed to allow variables to follow non-Brownian motion, 
although the model would then require some modifications.
-  In fin ite  life span of project. The project is assumed to 
continue indefinitely, once the initial investment has been made. 
This is a typical assumption in many investment prdjeets, since 
cash flows from the relatively short to medium term contribute 
most of the value of the project. However, the models used
17
could, in principle, be modified to permit analysis of projects 
With more finite life spans.
-  F ixed cost of capital. Some analytical models allow the 
company’s cost of capital to vary over time (see Chapter 4 for a 
brief discussion of the role of cost of capital in investment 
decision making). In the interest of mathematical tractability, 
however, it is assumed that the investing company’s cost of 
capital does not vary.
1.7 Summary
This chapter began by describing a key finding in investment decision 
making theory and indicated its applicabihty to the particular regional 
policy issue of inward investment policy. It then provided a brief rationale 
for applying these concepts to inward investment policy in the U.K.. Next, 
it described the new aspects of the research, outhned the structure of the 
thesis and the underlying methodology, and related the findings of the 
research to four recurrent themes in the related literature. Lastly, it 
described some opportunities to extend the analysis.
Chapter 2 that follows discusses government regional policy and inward 
investment policy objectives, as well as several other important themes such 
as minimising excess competition for investment. Chapter 2 thus provides a 
broad context for the discussion in Chapter 3 of the plant location decision 
making process, both in terms of how companies ass^s a country’s inherent
18
attractiveness for investment and how companies make investment 
decisions.
19
C hapter 2 
T he R ole o f Governm ent 
P olicy  in Encouraging Foreign  
D irect Investm ent
This chapter discusses the role of the government in encouraging inward 
investment, and leads into a discussion of corporate investment decision 
maldng in Chapter 3. These two chapters together therefore create a 
context within which the discussion of potential policy instruments in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 can be placed.
The chapter begins by introducing a framework, based on research by 
Vanhove and Klaasen (1986), that describes a comprehensive set of regional 
policy levers. Next, it provides a historical perspective on U.K. regional 
policy, before reviewing the objectives of the Thatcher/Major government
20
approach to inward investment. It then discusses the relative emphasis of 
different types of policy instruments in use and assesses their relative cost 
and selectivity. Next, it describes the potential application of option pricing 
approaches to six different categories of investment policies. Finally, it 
describe the rationale for selecting the particular area considered in the 
rest of the document, i.e., application to finsmcial incentives.
2.1 Elem ents of regional policy
Vanhove and Klaasen (1986) have identified a number of elements of 
regional policy; these are summarised in Figure 2.1. These authors divide 
regional policy into macro and micro policy. Macro policy seeks to influence 
“regional policy and expenditure.” Micro policy seeks to influence “the 
allocation of labour and capital between economic activities and regions.” 
Micro policy is then divided further into policies that reallocate labour and 
policies that reallocate capital.
The balance of activity in U.K. policy setting over the last 50-60 years 
has been by no means even across all the regioned policy elements, however. 
As will be seen in Section 2.2, U.K. regional policy has given very little 
emphasis to reallocating labour, either in situ or spatial (i.e. physical 
transfer of people). Far more important has been the reallocation of capital 
within the context of overall micro policy, and the research presented here 
will focus on this policy area. The levers used to implement reallocation of 
capital include subsidies and taxes to influience inputs or outputs of firms
21
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I
(and by extension, their actual location). The government spends 
significant resources every year in this area, both in foregone taxes and 
actual outlays for subsidies, and therefore examining ways to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of these levers is an important topic. In order to 
frame current activity in this area, the next section presents an historical 
overview of various aspects of regional policy.
2.2 H istorical overview o f U .K . regional 
policy
Before reviewing current government posture towards inward investment in 
detail, it is helpful to provide a perspective on major eras of U.K. regional 
policy (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). This analysis draws upon Yuill et al (1980), 
Brech and Sharp (1984), Vanhove and Klaasen (1986), Gibbs (1989), 
Bachtler (1990), Dicken and Tickell (1992), Martin (1993) and Collis and 
Noon (1994). As Aizenman and Marion (1991) have noted, there is 
evidence in developing countries that pohcy is persistent, and this policy 
persistence is also reflected here: the broad shape of U.K. regional policy 
has changed very little since its inception.
Broadly speaking, U.K. Regional policy can be broken down into 5 main 
eras (Yuill et al, 1980 have identified the first three, and I have added the 
final two). For purposes of this analysis, special provisions for Northern 
Ireland have not been identified explicitly, but are included in the broad
23
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policy approaches shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. The five eras are as follows:
• E arly  ex p erim en ta tio n /P o st W ar. The existence of national 
disparities in wealth was recognised as early as the 1920s, when 
certain areas of the country experienced extremely high 
unemployment (e.g. N. Ireland, Scotland, the North of England, S. 
Wales). Many of the key aspects of the U.K. approach to regional 
development were put in place within a decade: the provision of 
grants; the creation of development regions; the implementation of 
Industrial Development Certificates as a disincentive programme; and 
thé factory building program. All of these elements remained in some 
form or another for long periods of time, and some (e.g. grants and 
development regions) are stiU in place. Interestingly, the government 
experimented with moving workers to jobs via the Industrial
. Transference Board, which was disbanded in 1938; this represents the 
government’s only experimentation with spatial labour reallocation in 
nearly 70 years of policy making.
• R ap id  change/experim entation . Regional policy was relatively 
unimportant as an issue after the war until 1958/1959, when a severe 
recession refocused government attention on the area. In this period, 
the government switched frequently between grant and fiscal 
incentives, while trying to meet overall objectives of increased 
employment and improvements in the balance of payments. New 
regions were created, first Development Districts (1960), then 
Development Areas (1966). One key aspect of this era was the
26
increasing trend towards automatic aid, a feature that persisted until 
the 1980s. The Regional Employment Premium was also launched in 
this era; this incentive provides an important precedent for one of the 
pohcy instruments developed in this research, and will be discussed in 
greater detciil below (see Section 2.5.3).
E xpenditu re  grow th and decline. The election of the Labour 
government in 1972 provided the initiating event for the next era of 
development pohcy. In this era, the level of grants awarded increased 
dramatically until 1976, before a period of cutbacks took place 
(expenditure on the Regional Development Grant alone was i?400 
Milhon in 1976/77). In this era, three new types of development 
regions were also created: Special Development Areas, Development 
Areas and Intermediate Areas. While these three types of areas have 
now been consolidated into two, this broad framework is stiU in use 
today. The REP was discontinued in 1976, but the factory building 
programme and the IDC system were preserved. Significantly, the 
Scottish and Welsh Development agencies were also created in this 
era. The Invest in Britain Bureau was created in 1977 to promote the 
U.K. at large and coordinate the activities of the regional agencies. 
Despite the cutbacks in expenditure at the end of this era, regional 
assistance wcis provided to a large proportion of the country. For the 
last three years of this era, a remarkable 45% of the U.K. (including 
Northern Ireland) was designated as an assisted area, the highest in 
the community (Yuill et al, 1980). Belgium was the only other
27
country in the community with over 40% of its population included in 
Development zones.
• E arly  T hatcherism . Following the Conservative election victory in 
1979, the government followed a more free-market approach to 
regional policy and therefore sought opportunities to minimise the 
government’s role (although the political importance of job creation 
led to regular compromises). Perhaps responding to the financial 
largesse of the previous era, the government’s stated aim was to 
reduce public expenditure, concentrate on areas of greatest need, and 
increase the cost effectiveness of regional policy. The government 
continued its emphasis on automatic aid for grants, but increased its 
latitude in loan provision. In particular, it placed greater emphasis on 
providing financial assistance only where it was demonstrably 
necessary for a given project in order for it to go ahead. Also in this 
era, the areas covered in Special Development Areas and Intermediate 
areas were reduced.^ The factory building programme was preserved, 
but with a greater emphasis on self finance, and the threshold level 
for Industrial Development Certificate exemptions was raised, 
reducing its impact somewhat. The government also lifted exchange 
controls, a highly significant, if largely symbolic, step.^
^These remained constant at 35% of the country between 1985 and 1992, per Bachtler 
and Michie(1993).
^The 1947 Exchange Control act was only applied very loosely. Hodges (1974), cited 
in Brech and Sharp (1984), noted that less than half a dozen applications were refused in 
32 years of operation.
28
• Focus on selective assistance. Since the publication of the 
Department of Trade and Industry White Paper in 1988, “the whole 
tenor of pohcy has changed” (Gibbs, 1989). In particular, the White 
Paper totally abohshed automatic grants, one of the key features of 
U.K. regional pohcy until then, and encouraged a very free market 
oriented pohcy. To quote the White Paper, “..sensible economic 
decisions are best taken by those competing in the market place. The 
responsibility of government is to encourage the right climate so that 
markets work better and to encourage enterprise.” In this era, the 
government has also developed a new structure to promote and 
oversee inward investment. As Dicken and Tickell (1992) have noted, 
inward investment promotion in England now follows a hierarchical 
structure, with the IBB overseeing three territorial agencies (the 
Welsh, Scottish and N. Irish agencies) and five promotional agencies - 
the RDOs - which operate in England and almost always focus on 
pure investment promotion. Martin (1993) has noted that since the 
redrawing of the map of assisted areas in 1993, there has been a 
significant shift in emphasis for development aid from North to South. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given the severe recession of the early 
1990s, which hit the Southeast especially hard. Lastly, in this era, the 
government has also given greater emphasiis to small and medium 
companies, although grants are still available for large companies.
Having laid out the five main eras of U.K. development policy, it is 
helpful to articulate the themes which have remained consistent over these
29
eras. Later on in this thesis, it will then be possible to ensure that the final 
policy recommendations are consistent with them. The themes are as 
follows:
• The first theme is the continuing need for in tervention; despite 
over sixty years of regional pohcy, significant regional disparities 
remain. This intervention has tended to emphasise the same set of 
regions suffering from the legacy of past heavy industry and mining, 
but even parts of the Southeast have been considered suitable targets 
for intervention in the early 1990s.
• The second theme has been the underlying assumption - shared by 
both major pohtical parties - that inw ard investm ent has had  a 
ne t positive effect on regional development, and therefore should be 
encouraged.  ^ The pohcy lever of choice in encouraging such 
investment (at least since 1972) has been grant oriented incentives 
and selective loans, rather than fiscal aid.
®Some authors challenge this orthodoxy. Cowling and Sugden (1993), for exzunple, 
take a skeptical view. They write “...the approach of successive governriients, whether 
Conservative or Labour, has been typified by a largely unqualified acceptance of the case 
for inward investment; see Sugden (1989). There has been little monitoring of its actual 
consequences and yet it would seem clear the belief in its alleged benefits, in terms of bal­
ance of payments, employment, and technology base are not built on particularly secure 
fbundsitions. Whilst temporary gains may be observed, a long-term commitment to loca­
tions in Britain cannot be assured, and even where an investment of longer-term duration 
is made it cannot be assumed that such awztivity is congruent with the national interest.”
30
•  The third theme has been the government’s traditional em phasis on 
au tom atic  aid, i.e. aid is provided automatically if companies fulfil 
certain criteria. This theme persisted between about 1960 until the 
era beginning in 1988, when the government shifted its approach 
towards a more selective one. Given the government’s current 
financial constraints, the trend towards increasingly discretionary aid 
is unlikely to be reversed. This theme, therefore, is probably not 
helpful in éinticipating future policy approaches.
• The final theme is the governm ent’s willingness to  experim ent 
w ith  novel approaches, often taking a leadership role among 
European countries. These approaches would include the REP, the 
Service Industry Scheme, the factory building programme and the 
Industrial Development Certificate programme.
Less consistent over the eras has been the overall financial level of 
support, the balance of central versus regional intervention and the scope of 
assisted areas (i.e., the percentage of the population covered).
2.3 Foreign Direct Investm ent policy  
objectives
This section discusses the broad range of potential objectives of investment 
policy and U.K. objectives in the most recent era described above.
31
2.3.1 Broad framework o f policy options
Hilhorst (1990) has developed a compelling framework on regional 
development policy options which allows the U.K.’s general approach to be 
put in context. Later in this section, more specific policy objectives will be 
discussed, based on work by Brech and Sharp (1984) and others. Hilhorst 
defines five sets of options, which can be combined into policies of different 
levels of coherence: growth versus (income) distribution; functional versus 
territorial integration; private sector-led versus public-sector led 
development; concentration vs. dispersion; and migration versus capital 
aid. Growth vs. distribution can be through of as the choice between 
maximum growth and balanced income distribution. Functional versus 
territorial integration is based upon work by Friedmann and Weaver (1979), 
and can be thought of as the extent to which the history of a location 
should determine its economic role versus interregional specialization based 
on interregional trade and territorial advantage. As Hilhorst notes, these 
first two sets of options are closely related. The third set of options is 
private sector-led versus public sector-led development; he foUows here the 
traditional definition. Concentration versus dispersion is the decision to 
limit major share of invœtment to one (or a very few) locations in the 
country versus trying to stimulate investment in as many places as possible. 
Lastly, migration versus capital aid can be thought of as “people to the 
jobs” versus “jobs to the people” .
32
Having defined these five elements, Hilhorst permutes all of the possible 
combinations, leading to 16 different types of policy. He then assesses each 
for coherence (i.e. internal consistency) and identifies countries that have 
followed different approaches. Western Europe (including the U.K.) has 
generally followed his option 4, i.e. growth oriented, private led, dispersed 
investment rather than concentrated and capital led rather than migration 
oriented.^ He has identified a number of diverse alternative approaches, 
reflected by Mao’s China, the Ivory Coast, Cuba, Poland and others.
Having described the most broad conceptual parameters of U.K. regional 
policy, we can now examine more specific policy areas. Drawing upon the 
work of Brech and Sharp (1984) and other authors referred to in this 
chapter, I have identified six main types of objectives of overseas 
investment policy:
• P rim ary  job  creation. Creating jobs directly from inward 
investment is frequently a goal of regional development agencies. 
Indeed, many agencies use this as the primary criterion when 
evaluating whether or not to provide governmental support.
• Secondary job  creation. Secondary job creation refers to job 
creation not directly related to the initial investment (e.g. through 
increased employment at suppliers or distributors).
^Despite Norman Tebbit’s famous admonishment for young people to “get on your bike” 
to move to employment, policies under the Thatcher administration strongly favoured 
capital over migration policies.
33
• “S talking horse” for o ther co rpora te  functions. Rather than 
trying to encourage the formation of entire new companies in a 
country, a government agency can attempt to encourage functions to 
move in sequence to their country. For example, a country could 
attempt to attract manufacturing investment first, followed by 
manufacturing engineering, R & D, and perhaps ultimately marketing 
and sales.
• S tim ulus for dom estic industry . Encouraging local investment to 
simulate greater competitive ability in indigenous firms is a relatively 
common policy objective. As Brech and Sharp (1984) note, overseas 
investment can even stimulate gains from trade in industries which 
are “non-tradable” (i.e., products otherwise sheltered from 
competition by relatively high transport costs, such as cement).
• C ap ita l investm ent. Some governments seek to encourage capital 
investment for its own sake, in the apparent belief that it will 
stimulate a proportionately higher level of job creation. In fact, the 
reverse is often true in a modern economy: heavy industry which has 
high capital requirements may generate fax fewer jobs than 
“knowledge based” industries such as electronics and professional 
service firms.
• E ncouraging particu lar industries. Lastly, some governments 
seek to attract particular types of investment, in order to build 
competitive strengths in particular areas. Scottish Enterprise, for
34
example, has identified “high potential” sectors, and also provides 
investment where the private sector is unable to provide all the 
necessary funding (e.g. high risk ventures in high technology).
The relative balance of the U.K.’s adoption of these policy objectives will 
be discussed in the following section.
2.3 .2  O bjectives o f U .K . FD I policy
Overall, the U.K. has adopted a very encouraging stance towards foreign 
direct investment.® Relative to other EC countries in the 1980s, it took a 
middle position in terms of level of subsidy, except in Northern Ireland 
where it adopted one of the most aggressively subsidy oriented approaches 
(Yuill eind Allen, 1986, cited in Vanhove and Klaasen, 1986). Gibbs (1989) 
has also noted that both Reagan and Thatcher have “declared aims of 
breaking the cycle of negative expectations, renewing national optimism 
and confidence and encouraging a “general climate” whidi is conducive to 
efficient and competitive production.”
Within the broadly encouraging stance noted above, the relative 
importance of the six potential objectives identified above for U.K.
^While the national stance has been highly welcoming towards inward investment, 
Collis and Noon (1994) describe some of the negative attitude in the 1980s of the more 
radicad Metropolitan Councils. These councils questioned the value of inward investment 
and challenged the potential benefits, due to concerns over the quality of employment and 
the risks of excessive competition for inward investment.
35
investment policy is as follows (see Figure 2.4) :
• P rim ary  job creation - Very high level of em phasis. This has 
been one of the two key objectives of U.K. regional policy (the other 
has been stimulating capital investment). In the current policy 
regime, Regional Selective Assistance requires job creation or 
preservation as a precondition for an award.
• Secondary job  creation - High level of em phasis. Although not 
explicitly incorporated as ^  objective, it is w idely recognized by the 
government that primary investment often leads to secondary job 
creation.
• Stalking horse for o ther functions - Low level of em phasis. 
While the aurgument is often made that U.K. companies risk 
“hollowing out” their expertise by exporting their manufacturing 
functions (i.e. that other high value added areas such as design and 
R &D will follow), a ttrac tin g  these functions has not featured 
prominently as an objective of U.K. investment pohcy.
• Stim ulus for dom estic industry  - H igh level of em phasis. The
Secretary of State for Industry exphcitly recognized this objective as 
being important in a 1982 paper for the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC 1982, quoted in Brech and Sharp,
1984). The Secretary also used this paper to restate the government’s
®The analysis presented here is based upon work by Yuill et al (1980), Gibbs (1989) 
and other sources mentioned above.
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commitment to free operation of market forces: “The Government is 
committed to maintaining and strengthening the operation of market 
forces in order to improve the country’s economic performance. A free 
flow of inward investment contributes to this central policy objective 
by introducing additional productive capacity to compete with 
established sources in the U.K. and with imports, as well as to raise 
exports. Such investment, often bringing new technological skills and 
managerial expertise, tends to increase both the quality and the 
quantity of output and employment in this country.” The objective of 
stimulating inward investment to provide a model to domestic 
industry and as a way of building the strength of the economy was 
reiterated in the 1988 White Paper entitled “DTI - The Department 
for Enterprise.” (Cited in Strange, 1995).
• C apital investm ent - Very high degree of em phasis. This, 
along with job creation, has been one of the two key policy objectives 
for many years. As noted earher, there is continuing debate over the 
intrinsic merit of capital intensive projects, especially as they relate to 
job creation.
•  Encouraging particu la r industries - Low degree of em phasis.
Apart from special incentives targetted at high technology enterprises, 
the U.K.’s investment policy tends to be more region-focused than 
industry-focused. On a regional level, the policy is occasionally more 
industry specific (e.g. Scottish Enterprise’s encouragement of high 
technology industries).
38
It is worth noting that the evidence on the ability of overseas investment 
to stimulate the development of local capabilities (e.g. R &D) is mixed, 
especially given that this has been a key feature of the government’s policy. 
Munday (1990), for example, has studied the impact of Japanese 
investment in Wales in detail. He concludes that the Japanese have 
followed the four principles for inward investment proposed by the CBI in 
the early 1980s: high local content; net increase in jobs; high proportion of 
local manufacture should be exported; and the Japanese should not 
compete “unfairly” with their British counterparts (i.e. due to the financial 
assistance at startup). On the negative side, he points to aspects of the 
“branch plant” syndrome: real decision making power lies outside Wales, 
fluctuations in the parent country’s economy reflect themselves in the 
Welsh economy, there are few research and development facilities in the 
Welsh plants, and - perhaps as a result - there are also limitations in the 
quality of employment that can be offered. Of these four, particularly 
worrying from a local capability building perspective is the lack of local 
R &D and parent companies’ unwillingness to transfer managerial authority 
to the Welsh plants (a pre-requisite for building local management skill).
2.4 N ational policy instrum ents
Having discussed the overall objectives of U.K. investment policy in the 
previous section, I will now describe the broad types of policy instruments 
available and the degree of emphasis each has had in recent U.K. policy.
39
2.4.1 General framework
Vanhove and Klaasen (1986) have identified and described six broad types 
of policy instruments. These are the following:
• In fras tru c tu re  aids. Vanhove and Klaasen (1986) cite the 13 
categories of regional infrastructure identified by D. Biehl (1986), 
including transportation, communications, energy supply, water 
supply, location (e.g. industrial sites), environment (e.g. waste 
treatment, water purification), education, health, special urban (e.g. 
fire protection, technological transfer agencies), sport and tourist 
facilities, social facilities (e.g. OAP homes, housing, creches), cultural 
facilities and natural endowment. Each of these has potential impact 
on plant location decisions.
• F inancial incentives. Vanhove and Klaasen identify five types of 
regional financial incentives: capital grant, interest related subsidy, 
tax concession, depreciation allowance and labour related subsidy. 
Traditionally governments have paid great attention to this policy 
lever (see Yuill et al, 1980-, for a comprehensive description of 
European policy approaches).
D isincentives. These measures seek to control the location of 
enterprise, e.g. by denying planning permission in congested areas.
D ecentralisation of governm ent offices. By decentrahsing its 
offices, a government can provide regional benefits through local job
creation.
40
• Regional allocation of public investm ent and governm ent 
orders. By sharing its own procurement among the regions, a 
government can provide stimulus to depressed regions.
• Regional developm ent agencies. By creating regional 
development agencies, a government can promote economic 
development in depressed areas. In particular, the agencies will be 
able to develop much better local knowledge than a purely centralized 
agency.
2.4.2 U .K . policy em phasis
These policy instruments have received different degrees of emphasis in 
recent U.K. regional policy (Figure 2.5).^ The relative degree of emphasis is 
as follows:
• In fras tru c tu re  aids- Low and declining im portance. In general, 
the U.K. has provided a reasonable level of infrcistructure to potential 
investors, in such areas as transport, communications, etc. As noted 
earlier, the U.K. has maintained a factory building programme since 
World War II, although on a relatively small scale. This programme 
has become less important as a policy lever in recent years, as the 
government has increased its emphasis on self-finance. It could be 
argued that the government’s privatization of power generation and.
^This summary draws on Vanhove and Klaiasen (1986) emd other sources cited in this 
chapter.
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more recently, rail, contributes to improving the U.K.’s infrastructure, 
although these are only loosely hnkcd with regional policy.
•  Financial incentives - V ery high im portance. As Figure 2.2 
shows, this has been the key pohcy instrument in the U.K. for many 
years. A broad range of grants and loans are available; these are 
summarized and discussed in more detail below in Section 2.5.1.
•  Disincentives - C urren tly  un im portan t. For many years until it 
was dropped in 1981, the government’s Industrial Development 
Certificate programme acted as its key disincentive. It was uniquely 
effective relative to other similar types of measures available in 
European countries, although its importance did decline gradually 
over a long period of time. Twomey and Taylor (1985) studied the 
refusal rate for ID Os between 1960 and 1977. The rate rose to a peak 
refusal rate of 6% in 1961, and declined overall (with some volatility) 
until 1974. In 1974, the refusal rate fell to well below 1%, and 
remained at a low level until it was ultimately dropped in 1981.
•  D ecentralisation of governm ent offices - H igh im portance. 
Since the second world war, a relatively high proportion of jobs have 
been created in assisted areas. Some government offices have been 
devolved to the regions, such as the Department of Motor Vehicles in 
Swansea.
• Regional allocation of public investm ent and governm ent 
orders - M oderate  im portance. There are cases of nationahzed
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industries being required to locate in development areas (e.g. British 
Steel before privatisation was not allowed to build a new facility in  
the Southeast, but instead was required to build its facility in the 
depressed Teeside region). Some government purchasing programmes 
also give preference to contracts fulfilled by firms in depressed areas, 
all other factors being equal.
• Regional development agencies - Moderate importance.
Regional development agencies were first created in the 1972-1979 era, 
and have persisted since. Both the Welsh Development Agency and 
Scottish Enterprise maintain a fairly strong local presence, 
independent of the central government, and therefore this lever has 
been fairly important to the U.K. in some parts of the country.
2.5 T ypes o f econom ic incentives
This section draws some general observations about current investment 
incentives before describing two key incentives currently offered. It also 
describes the old Regional Employment Premium. Understanding these 
instruments is important to put the new instruments discussed in Chapter
6 in context.
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2.5.1 G eneralizations about current incentives
A wide range of inv^tment incentives are available in the U.K. to investing 
firms (Figure 2.6).® These incentives can be broken into six broad areas: 
U.K. incentives, which are not industry specific; local authority incentives; 
industry incentives; R &D incentives; special incentives, which include 
export financing, free trade zones and science parks; and EU incentives. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse each of these in detail, but five 
broad observations can be made.
• First, the U .K . tends to  favour g ran ts over ta x  based 
incentives or direct labour subsidies. This has probably 
contributed to simplicity of implementation, since fiscal measures 
tend to change frequently and direct labour subsidies can be complex 
and expensive to administer. Bachtler and Michie (1993) have noted 
that in the U.K., and broadly in Europe, the réinge of incentives has 
narrowed in recent years and has also become more grant focused. 
Also broadly in line with European trends has been the U.K.’s 
emphasis on more targeted assistance (i.e. automatic grants have 
been replaced with more selective ones).
• Second, the traditional support for direct invœtments in fixed assets 
has been complemented with “prom oting  th e  business 
environm ent through softer, non-fixed asset aspects of 
com pany developm ent such as consultancy” (Bachtler and
^While Northern Ireland does have special investment incentives, these have not been 
separately identified and discussed.
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Michie, 1993). This represents a fairly significant change in the 
mindset of development agencies.
•  Third, there are very  few incentives given to  p a rticu la r 
industries. This is probably wise, given Western Economies’ poor 
performance in implementing industrial policy. Some regional 
agencies, such as Scottish Enterprise, have experimented more 
aggressively with industrial policy-like initiatives.
• Fourth, there is no discrim ination in investm ent assistance 
between overseas investm ent and local investm ent. Virtually 
all of the investment incentives are “origin blind” , i.e. are available 
equally to domestic and overseas investors. This provides a “level 
playing field”, but may reduce the government’s flexibiUty in 
attracting particularly desirous inward investment.
•  Fifth, local au thorities in England, Scotland and  W ales have 
considerable scope to  influence investm ent a t a  local level.
This is reflected by the myriad of local incentives available (e.g. land 
provision and preparation, rent relief grants, relief grants towards 
borrowing costs).
One interesting aspect of Figure 2.6 is the sheer range and diversity of 
different types of incentives. This is particularly striking when one 
considers that these incentives are in place in a government that is strongly 
committed to the operation of a free market. This apparent inconsistency
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probably reflects the difficulty of resolving some of the long standing 
regional disparities in the U.K. (as noted in Section 2.2).
2.5.2 D iscussion o f specific current policy  
Instrum ents
This section discusses two specific instruments in more detail: Regional 
Selective Assistance and national investment incentives. The section relies 
upon material from Price Waterhouse (1994, 1995) and the Invest in 
Britain Bureau (1996), among other sources.
Regional selective assistance
The major policy instrument for regional development is Regional Selective 
Assistance (RSA), which consists of two types: project grants and exchange 
risk guarantees. The RSA grant is a discretionary and negotiable grant 
available for both manufacturing and service sector projects, Projects must 
require capital expenditure and create or safeguard employment in Assisted 
Areas (i.e. Development Areas or Intermediate Areas). Importantly, 
assistance is provided only to firms where the investment would not have 
been made anyway. A number of industries are subject to EU restrictions 
(e.g. iron and steel, shipbuilding). Payments are typically made in three 
separate tranches, and the DTI works to determine the minimum level of 
subsidy required to encourage a company to invest. A number of costs are 
eligible for assistance, including land purchase, site preparation and 
buildings, plant and machinery, and some other costs (e.g. patent rights,
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installation and re-installation of machinery). Importantly, relocation 
projects are not normally eligible unless there is a net increase in jobs. This 
continues the government’s long-standing de-emphasis on migration and 
mobility policies. Most regional DTI offices can approve grants up to £2  
milhon, although they generally involve the London office in awarding 
grants over £ \  million.
The second type of grant is the exchange risk guarantee. This grant is 
primarily directed at offsetting the risk undertaken when a company 
accepts a loan in a local currency from the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). This incentive is clearly highly specialized, and not of 
great national importance.
Vanhove and Klaasen (1986) have identified five well known drawbacks to 
grant based systems. First, the schemes tend to expensive. Second, the 
financial responsibility of the government agencies is greater than with an 
interest rate rebate system. Third, grants can lead to inflationary pressure 
in other regions. Fourth, receiving grants can feel somewhat humiliating to 
local regions. Lastly, eind most importantly, grants tend to bias investment 
towards capital intensive projects. Nonetheless, they remain an important 
policy instrument in the U.K..
National investment incentives
A second important type of regional pohcy instrument is national 
investment incentives. These consist primarily of tax relief on investment
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expenditure. They include 100% first year allowance for the costs of 
buildings in enterprise zones and scientific research costs. There are also 
general allowances for plant and machinery (25%) and industrial buildings 
(4% flat rate). In 1995, the 4% flat rate was extended to roads. Price 
Waterhouse notes that although there are few tax incentives per se, there 
are three general factors that make the U.K. fiscally attractive: relatively 
low corporate taxes, an extensive network of double tax treaties which 
provide exemption or relief from U.K. withholding tax on interest and 
royalties, and no withholding tax on dividends paid by U.K. resident 
companies.
The government expenditure for these incentives can be substantial. A 
1982 National Economic Development Organization study described in 
Brech and Sharp (1984) estimated that the total of these allowances was 
£5,300 million for 1980/1981 (domestic and overseas investments).
2.5.3 R egional Em ploym ent Prem ium
One policy instrument of importance to this research is the Regional 
Employment Premium (REP), in that it creates a precedent for direct 
government intervention in labour rates. Yuill et al (1980) have reviewed 
the history of this instrument, and this brief discussion is based upon their 
analysis and further discussion in Vanhove and Klaasen (1986). The REP 
was begun in 1967 by the incumbent Labour government, and its purpose 
was to subsidise labour costs directly in Development Areas and Special
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Development areas. It was felt that the REP had two main benefits. First, 
it gave poorer regions an additional labour cost advantage to offset other 
potentially higher costs (e.g. transport). Second, it avoided the traditional 
capital orientation of regional incentives. Vanhove and Klaasen identify five 
reasons for its introduction: it implied no discrimination against existing 
firms; it gave special encouragement to labour intensive types of industry; it 
cut regional production costs and so had the positive effects of a regional 
devaluation without the negative ones (no higher import prices); it 
minimised the spreading of effects to other regions; and it incorporated an 
income transfer from rich to poor regions.
In operation, subsidies were paid directly to assisted companies based 
upon the employee base. Different levels of subsidy were paid for full time 
men, women/boys, emd girls. It was intended to have a significant impact 
on assisted companies’ labour costs; at the time of its introduction, the 
REP was estimated to account for between 7 and 8 percent of assisted 
firms’ labour cost.
In 1970, a new Conservative Government took office, and announced that 
it would phase out the program in line with its objective to reduce 
government intervention. The programme had become very expensive to 
implement, given its non-selective implementation. The following Labour 
government announced a new set of subsidies in July, 1976 which cut the 
overall level of assistance and reduced the disparity of support between the 
sexes. Before these new levels could be put into practice, however, the REP
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was abolished completely in December, 1976.
While no longer in place, the REP is relevant to this research because the 
implementation of the volatility minimisation instrument described later 
incorporates some similar elements (although in this research, the 
volatility of labour cost is subsidised, not the absolute cost level). As will 
be shown later, the volatility minimisation instrument preserves many of 
the advantages of direct intervention in labour costs, but at minimal cost.
2.6 A ttractiveness o f individual 
instrum ents
The instruments described in Section 2.5 vary significantly in their total 
cost and selectiveness (See Figure 2.7 for an analysis of selected 
instruments). This matrix will be used later in this thesis to compare the 
recommended new policy instrument with current and historical pohcy 
instruments. The ideal policy instrument would of course be low cost. The 
issue of selectiveness is more complex. Ideally, the instrument would be 
sufficiently flexible to be applied selectively when required to meet 
particular government objectives. However a low cost policy instrument 
need not necessarily be selectively deployed.
Both the Regional Employment Premium and the Regional Development 
Grant are in the high cost/low degree of selectiveness quadrant. Both were 
ultimately dropped over concerns over their total cost to implement.
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Regional Selective Assistance and Loan Programmes are far more selective, 
but they are also relatively high cost. Nonetheless, they are both likely to 
have a long term role in regional policy. Tourism promotion and Exchange 
rate guarantees to the Steel industry are both highly selective, but 
relatively low cost. Their extreme focus tends to diminish their overall 
significance in regional pohcy, however. The ideal location in the matrix for 
a pohcy instrument would be on the low end of the cost axis. It would also 
need to be broad-based (i.e. applicable to many industries). The 
instrument could range anywhere on the selectiveness dim ension. As will be 
seen in Section 6.2.4, the most significant proposed new pohcy instrument 
fits this criterion.
2.7 Prevention o f excess com petition for 
investm ent
This section provides a brief discussion of one final important topic in 
regional policy: preventing excess competition for investment. While a full 
treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to 
provide a brief introduction to it so that the imphcations of the final 
recommendations on this area may be assessed.
Guisinger (1985), as cited in Dicken and TickeU (1992), “drew the 
analogy between the competitive behaviour of business enterprises seeking 
to increase market share for their products and the competitive behavior of
54
countries seeking to capture an increasing share of foreign investment 
projects.” Guisinger then extended this analogy to the sub-national scale 
(e.g. in the promotional behaviour of RDOs®). This analogy is significant in 
understanding the behaviour of both countries and local regions. As Porter 
(1980) has written, one of the five determinants of the attractiveness of an 
industry is the degree of company rivalry. This can range from the extreme 
(e.g. aggressive price cutting in the ship building industry) to informal 
cartels that keep prices high. This concept of rivalry applies equally to 
development agencies. One would expect variations in the degree of 
aggressiveness of inward promotion, and indeed this is observed. Faced with 
this reality, national and supra-national governments have attempted to 
place hmits on the degree of inward investment promotion.
Although the issue of limiting investment promotion will not be discussed 
in detail in this research, it is worth briefly describing the current European 
model, in order to ensure that the new instruments proposed in Chapter 6 
axe consistent with current EC practice. Historically, the EC has sought to 
minimise destructive competition for investment by establishing 
coordination solution aid ceilings. In 1979, for example, the maximum aid 
for the U.K. (excluding N. Ireland) as a net-grant-equivdent percentage of 
initial investment was 30%, or a ceiling of 5500 European units of account 
(cited in Yuill et al, 1980). For Northern Ireland, the amount was a 
staggering 75% of net-grant-equivalent or 13,000 European Units of 
Account. Even given these constraints, local areas are still able to provide
^Regional Development Organisations.
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aggressive additional incentives, such as site preparation.
2.8 P otentia l application o f option  
techniques to national policy  
instrum ents
Option pricing techniques axe applicable to all six types of policy 
instruments described in Figure 2.5. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
analysis to apply these techniques to all these instruments. Instead, the 
focus of the remaining analysis will be to apply option pricing techniques to 
financial incentives. To do this requires two basic types of analysis. First, 
the equations to be described in Chapter 4 may be used to identify a new 
set of instruments that encourage investment by minimising uncertainty. 
Second, the impact of Poisson events may be incorporated into the 
investment decision. Poisson events refer to single, “step changes”, e.g., the 
possibility of a change in tax rate. These will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.8 describes how option pricing techniques may also be applied to 
the rem aining five types of policy levers referred to in Section 2.4.2 above. 
Note that in every case. Poisson events may be used to model the impact of 
single events, such as the government’s re-imposition of a disincentive 
programme that would block the proposed investment (the possibility of 
analysing multiple uncertain events is discussed briefly below). The
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complete set of six policy levers can be categorised into areas of higher or 
lower potential for application of option theory:
• There are h igher im pact opportun ities to apply this thinking to 
financial incentives and infrastructure aids. The most attractive area 
for application of option theory is the one considered in the remainder 
of this thesis: financial incentives. Analysing this area allows 
consideration of two types of uncertainty in the investment decision 
(i.e. both volatility and Poisson events). It would also be possible to 
model potential infrastructure building programmes with Poisson 
events (e.g. road building), but these will not be considered further.
• The remaining four levers are lower im pact opportunities. Poisson 
event modeling could be used for three additional levers (i.e. 
decentralisation of government offices, regional allocation of public 
investment and government orders, regional development agencies), 
but these will not be considered further in this analysis. Disincentives 
are no longer an important policy lever, and so option theory would 
probably have limited practical application.
Some academic work is also being conducted that models the potential 
impact of m ultip le events, for example the possibility of a tax credit being 
instated and then withdrawn at a later date. Metcalf and Hassett (1993, as 
described in Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), for example, have modeled the 
impact of tax credits on investment decision making. They analysed 
investment where there is a probability Ai of implementing a tax credit
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when it is not already in place, and a probability Aq of withdrawing it if it 
is in place. They found that “uncertainty about the enactment of stimulus 
policies is likely to have a very detrimental effect on investment. In fact, if 
a government wishes to accelerate investment, the best thing it can do is to 
enact a tax credit right away, threaten to remove it soon, emd sweax never 
to restore it (high Aq and low Ai). The credibility of such a policy is, of 
course, open to doubt.” More detailed analysis such as this could be appHed 
to all six policy levers.
2.9 Sum m ary
This chapter provides an analysis of the government’s regional policy 
objectives and approach to stimulating inward investment. As such, it 
provides the overall context within which companies make investment 
decisions. In particulax, it provides insight into five important areas of U.K. 
regional policy:
• G enera l regional policy objectives. Based on analysis of five eras 
of regional policy, several themes emerge. These include the 
continuing need for regional intervention, the long-standing belief by 
both parties that inwaxd investment should be encouraged and the 
government’s willingness to experiment with innovative approaches.
# Investm en t policy objectives* Based on academic research, six 
types of investment policy objectives were identified and assessed for 
their relative importance. Primary job creation and capital
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investment were the two most important objectives, followed by 
stimulus for domestic industry, secondary job creation, encouraging 
particular industries and encouraging the eventual transfer of other 
corporate functions.
• Investm ent policy instrum ent emphasis. In the area of policy 
instrument emphasis to encourage investment, the government has 
given primary emphasis to financial incentives, followed by 
decentralisation of government offices, creation of regional 
development agencies, regional allocation of public investment and 
government orders, and infrastructure aids. Disincentives have not 
been used since .1981 as a policy lever.
• A pproach to  investm ent incentives. While there are a plethora of 
investment incentives available, some broad generalisations may be 
drawn. These include emphasis of grants over tax incentives or labour 
subsidies, introduction of broader support to businesses (e.g. provision 
of consultancy services), limited application of industrial poHcy, and 
equal treatment of inward investment and domestic investment. It 
was noted that local authorities have a significant role in influencing 
local investment decision making. Some discussion was also included 
of the cost and selectivity of paxticuleur incentives. It was concluded 
that the ideal instrument would be low cost to administer, but leave 
some flexibility in how selectively the government chose to adopt it.
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• Avoiding excess com petition for investm ent. This chapter 
discussed briefly the potentially destructive effect of excess  
competition for investment, and noted the important role of EC 
legislation. The impact of the proposed volatility-minimisation 
instrument on competition for investment will be described further in 
Chapter 7.
Each of these areas will be discussed further in Chapter 7 to assess the 
coherence of the recommendations with recent themes in regional policy 
and investment policy. This later chapter will also draw upon the 
description of the Regional Employment Premium to discuss similarities 
and differences between the proposed new volatility minimisation 
instrument and the old REP.
Moving forward. Chapter 3 discusses key issues in plant location decision 
making from the perspective of the investing company. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
then describe an analytical approach used to identify and assess potential 
pohcy instruments to encourage inward investment.
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C hapter 3 
T he Overseas Plant L ocation  
D ecision
This chapter explores two key aspects of an overseas plant location 
decision: how companies make investment decisions and how they assess 
the inherent attractiveness of a particular location. This analysis therefore 
summarizes important aspects of the plant location decision from the 
co rpora te  investor’s side (the previous Chapter was concerned with how 
national and regional policy makers seek to attract inward investment).
Figure 3.1 shows a simple framework that captures these two aspects of 
the plant location decision and their interaction. The left side of the 
framework shows different schools of thought regarding the location 
decision, both  analytical (i.e. “rational econom ist”) and “pure” behavioural 
(these are the circles within the box). Cost based approaches are shown as 
a subset of capability based approaches for reasons that will be discussed in
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Section 3.1.2 below. Since all decision making needs to be considered in 
light of behavioural factors, the small circles are shown within a larger box 
covering all behavioural aspects. The right side of the framework is a 
placeholder used for the detailed framework to assess a country’s 
attractiveness as discussed in Section 3.2 below. Following general 
exposition of the framework, the U.K.’s attractiveness is assessed in Section 
3.3 using the framework.
3.1 Firm  investment decision making 
processes
This section discusses how firms make investment decisions. It begins with 
some theoretical background on why companies invest overseas and then 
describes investment decisions based upon three different approaches: cost 
based, capability based, and behavioural.
3.1.1 R ationale for foreign direct investm ent
The traditional economist view of foreign direct investment is that it 
arises because of imperfections in product and factor markets (see for 
example, Collis and Noon, 1994). This theoretical rationale for investment 
leads naturally to evaluating potential plant location opportunities on a 
primarily cost-driven basis. As Collis and Noon have written “The decision 
to produce abroad, rather than to export or license, arises when economic 
rent obtained from possessing these advantages can be increased by
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production in a foreign location. Because of the existence of transaction 
costs in marketing such advantages (e.g. taxes paid on market transactions) 
there is an incentive for TNCs^ to internalize transactions within the firm 
rather than through the market. In choosing where to produce, TNCs 
consider locational factors such as relative labour costs and regionad 
financial incentives.” As will be seen later in the chapter, cost is only a 
subset, albeit an important one, of the factors that should be considered 
when a company makes an investment decision.
3.1.2 Cost based approaches
A wide variety of differing approaches have been developed to assess the 
costs and benefits of a plant location decision. For the purposes here, these 
approaches will be grouped under the heading of the “rational economist” 
approach to plant location decision making. ^
Approaches to this problem tend to begin with abstract models of firms 
and customers, and include different types and complexities of cost factors 
(e.g. labour, land, raw materials, transport costs, energy, insurance, costs of
^TNC is an acronym for “transnational corporation”
^Note that this is somewhat different than the definition that is sometimes used by 
economists. Baumol and Blinder (1985), for example, use the term “rational” to a^ply to 
the means, not the ends. In other words, their definition asks whether the decision making 
behaviour will fulfil the desired objective, whether or not that objective is rational. In 
this thesis, it is more appropriate to focus on whether the plant location objective is 
appropriate, i.e. maximizes the financial and other benefits to the investing company.
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decision making). Hilhorst (1990) and Chisholm (1990) have described 
some of the early literature in this area. Weber (1929) identified transport 
cost minimization as a key input into decisions and therefore regional 
organisation. Hoover (1948) analysed transport costs, and found that 
transport cost does not increase proportionately with distance (e.g. due to 
fixed terminal costs such cis storage, on-loading and off-loading). As a 
result, transport costs are less important in the aggregate as distance 
increases and therefore intermediate locations are less attractive than they 
w ould otherw ise be. Isard (1956) studied transport and production costs in 
different locations, and concluded that a firm will locate where increases in 
production costs just offset decreases in transport cost. These types of 
considerations are now routinely incorporated into company investment 
decisions.
Purely cost based decisions often suffer from a key weakness: they are 
frequently conduced on a static basis, i.e. without incorporating the fact 
that factor costs tend to increase over time (Bartmess and Cemy, 1993). 
Ohmae (1985) refers to this phenomenon as the “expense of cheap labor”. 
MacCormack et al (1994) remark that “companies continuing to focus on 
direct labor cost savings may find transitory eidvantages, but eventually, as 
has happened in Korea, cost pressures will wipe out such advantages.” 
Unless these expected increases over time are taken into account the results 
are likely to be disappointing (Bartmess and Cerny, 1993).
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Purely cost based approaches also ignore a number of other key aspects 
of the overseas investment decision. Markides and Berg (1988) have 
summarized some of these. They include the risks of being subject to local 
government pressures (e.g. to increase domestic content), alienating key 
domestic stakeholders (e.g. unions), fleeting factor cost advantages (e.g. due 
to labour cost increases as noted above), weakened corporate capabilities 
from “hollowing out” the company (e.g. losing design and manufacturing 
skills) and discovering higher than expected operating costs in the local 
region. The actual transfer of technology can also have a major impact on 
the economics of an overseas plant investment or plant relocation.
Galbraith (1990) has studied the effect of transferring core manufacturing 
technologies in high technology businesses, and has discovered that 
managers, engineers and operators almost unanimously underestimated the 
complexity of the transfer. The transfers usually resulted in a short term 
loss of productivity in the receiving plant of 9 months to reach pre-transfer 
levels of productivity. Taking advantage of a period of co-production 
reduced the time to 5.3 months, but was still significant. Delays of this 
scale can have a significant impact on the economies of plant locations and 
relocations if they are not accounted for correctly.
3.1.3 C apability based
Purely cost based approaches implicitly assume that the location of a 
plant has little or no impact on a company’s overall competitiveness or 
internal operations, beyond the effect of the cost of operations on the total
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cost structure. Recent work (Bartmess and Cerny, 1993) has begun to note 
that the physical locations of functions within a company can support or 
undermine its capabilities and therefore its ability to compete. Other work 
has noted that the local infrastructure can have a significant impact on a 
company’s competencies.^ Rosenfield et al in Bartmess (1994) has noted 
that in making a investment decision, a company’s competencies should 
dictate workforce and infrastructure requirements and ultimately the site 
location. MacCormack et al (1994) make a similar point by dividing 
infrastructure into “hard” requirements (e.g. communication and transport 
systems) and “soft” requirements (e.g. workforce education levels, suppliers 
with specific technical know-how). They note that these soft factors axe 
often overlooked in traditional location algorithms but can be the most 
important sources of competitive advantage.
Wheelwright in Bartmess (1994) reinforces the importance of the 
capability/competence approach. He notes that even in the narrowest plant 
location decision - the facility/site question (i.e. where to locate a single 
plant) - there are three types of approach, only one of which relies upon 
cost as its primary source of competitive advantage. The first type of 
facility is found in companies requiring high volume/low cost, and is 
typically located offshore in low labor cost areas. These plants are 
continually evaluated on their ability to provide the lowest possible costs
 ^While there are some technical differences between competencies and capabiliti^, both 
terms relate to a company’s ability to sustain competitive advantage. .S ^  Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) for a good introduction to corporate competencies.
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(and are therefore implicitly prepared to shut down or relocate as required). 
The second type of facility is found in com panies which rely upon intense  
interaction with their customers (e.g. metal can and plastic bottle plants). 
The third facility type can be found in companies that compete primarily 
on product design and features in a rapidly changing technological 
environment. As Wheelwright notes, these plants rely upon close ties 
between development engineering and manufacturing. The analysis in 
Bartmess and Cerny (1993) would suggest that for this type of company, 
m aking a plant location  decision w ithout considering the interaction 
between manufacturing and development engineering could have a 
significemt negative effect on the company’s competitiveness.
While in principle a cost implication may be assigned to nearly all of 
these competency oriented factors, this is not always done in practice. As 
MacCormack et al (1994) note, “Decisions are often based purely on 
quantitative analyses that trade off transfer costs, scale economies, and 
other cost-based variables. This practice, however, can lead to suboptimal 
results, as decision makers tend to focus only on factors that are easily^ 
quantifiable. Important qualitative issues are frequently neglected or used 
only to temper results.” For the purpose of this thesis, it will be assumed 
that the impact of location decisions on a company’s capabilities and 
competencies can be quantified, at least approximately. The policy 
instruments described in Chapter 6 may then be applied to the broadly 
defined overseas invœtment decision, including both traditional cost-based
^Original emphasis
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elements and more capability oriented ones.
3.1.4 “P ure” behavioural approaches
A second approach to analysing overseas investment decisions argues that 
decisions are not made primarily on a rational, analytically oriented basis, 
but are often made primarily on the basis of behavioural factors. The 
author’s experience in working with major multinationeds in the U.K., U.S. 
and Europe has found instances of decision making that are at odds with 
rational, fact-based economic decision making. I have identified five specific 
examples below, disguised for Confidentiality, each of which shows a 
corporate decision that was made primarily on the basis of behavioural (i.e. 
non-economic) factors (see Appendix B for summary of interview locations 
and dates).®
Case exam ples
The five specific case examples are as follows:
• A global pharm aceutical com pany invested several hundred 
million pounds in a research facility based upon a one page proposal 
to the board. The company’s cash flow was embarrassingly strong, 
and the research facility seemed an attractive way to build 
relationships with the government. In addition, the company had a
I^n disguising the case exam ples, I have adjusted  Specific det^s so that the pawrticular 
compsmy is not readily identifiable. The essential outline of the examiple has been left 
unaltered, however.
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strongly research-based culture that supported such a move. No 
detailed financial analysis of its potential costs and benefits was 
conducted prior to board approval. The company subsequently 
merged, and thereby gained access to high quality research facilities. 
In the end, it closed some of the research space, almost certainly 
without having achieved an appropriate level of return.
•  A light m anufacturing company planned to invest in an Asian 
operation, based upon the manager’s instincts that costs would be 
lower there. However, the manager had other motivations as well.
The plant was located in a remote location, and an overseas location 
provided the opportunity to justify lavish business travel to exotic 
locations. Actual analysis of the proposed investment showed that it 
had at best a poor return. Nonetheless, the manager was determined 
to invest there for the reasons described above.
# A global consum er goods com pany was undertaking a review of 
its head office costs. It was discovered that the company was paying 
drivers for its board of directors at double the local market rate. In 
addition, the drivers were so underutilized that the company had to 
construct a billiards room in the basement of the head office, at high 
expense given the cost per square foot of the office space. By any pure 
economic analysis, there was substantial opportunity to reduce cost in 
this area. However, the drivers learned of the cost reduction plan, and 
lobbied the wives of the directors.® The senior executive running the
®There were no female board directors
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cost reduction programme was reluctant to challenge the board on the 
issue, and as a result, the plan to reduce costs was dropped.
A global insurance brokerage spent a large percentage of an entire 
year’s profits on a several year renovation programme for its listed 
head office, during a period of time when the company’s operating 
results were very poor. The renovation was cosmetic, not structural, 
and was based upon a vague sense that the company needed a quality 
office building to impress clients. The share price, however, was 
already low, and the lavish spending programme did little to reassure 
the financial markets that the company was serious about reversing 
the poor operating results. In fact, the share price continued to 
decline, in part due to the company’s unwillingness to tackle costs 
seriously.
A global fragrance m anufactu rer was scheduled to submit a bid 
in the U.S. for a very important commission (approximately 30 % of 
total revenue for the U.S. operation). As is typical in the industry, it 
created an internal competition among its perfumers (i.e. the 
individuals who create fragrances by blending together different 
ingredients), involving perfumers in both Europe and the U.S. The 
final selection process to choose the submitted fragrance, however, 
was heavily biased in favour of the U.S. perfumer submission, 
regardless of the quality of the European submissions. As a result, the 
company lost the benefit of its European expertise in a critical bid.
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Eanh of these case examples describes an example of poor corporate 
decision making that ultimately cost the company resources, either directly 
of indirectly. The fciilures in the decision making process that led to these 
poor decisions can be divided into two types: failures from individual 
decision making, and failures from collective decision making.
Individual decision making
In the case of the light manufacturing company, the failure to make a 
rational economic decision depended mostly upon one individual’s decision 
making. Although his decision was nominally subject to corporate review, 
the review was superficial. In fact, he had been delegated sufficient 
authority to make the decision himself, and was unlikely ever to be subject 
to any senior level management scrutiny over the decision.
Collective decision making
The other examples shown above describe failures in collective decision 
making, i.e. in how organizations actually make decisions when multiple 
individucils are involved. Kotter (1985) has built up a substantial theory on 
leadership and decision making. He has argued that the workforce is 
growing both more diverse (e.g. different nationalities, backgrounds, etc.) 
and more interdependent (e.g. more coordination required to make 
decisions). He writes that these factors often lead to conflict, which can 
either be handled well or poorly. If the conflict is handled well, the . 
organization gains the benefit of more original thinking, leading to “more
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creative solutions to problems and more innovative products and services.” 
If the conflict is handled poorly, the organization gets locked into 
“bureaucratic infighting, parochial politics and destructive power struggles.”
The case examples above demonstrate the potential impact on a 
company when complex decisions are made poorly. In the case of the 
pharmaceutical and light manufacturing companies, limited internal politics 
emerged, but the company lost the benefit of optimal decision making. In 
the case of the consumer goods company, some bureaucratic infighting did 
emerge over the proper approach to the drivers’ pay, and more intense 
struggles emerged in the office renovation of the insurance brokerage. In the 
case of the global fragrance manufacturer, the company behaved exactly as 
Kotter predicted: the organization was locked in a bitter dispute that 
blunted its opportunities for competitive success. The struggle that 
emerged led to “higher costs and enhanced organizational frustration,” 
both of which are predicted by Kotter’s analysis.
For my purposes, behavioural approaches will not be considered further. 
Plant location decisions should ultimately be made upon rational 
application of cost and capability oriented factors. While behavioural 
factors certainly play a role, they should not be allowed to detract from the 
underlying economics.
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3.2 A ssessing a country’s inherent 
attractiveness for investm ent
This section describes a general framework that can be used to identify the 
inherent attractiveness of a country for overseas investors and then applies 
it to the U.K. By using this framework, it is possible to understand the 
“outside in” attractiveness of investment opportunities in the U.K.
3.2.1 G eneral framework
As Kogut (1985) has stated, “Global strategies...rest on the interplay 
between the competitive advantage of firms and the comparative 
advantage^ of countries.” Manufacturing investment is a key aspect of any 
global strategy, and therefore both firm competitive advantage and country 
comparative advantage are required for successful global strategies. This 
section describes a framework developed by the author that can be used to 
assess the comparative advantage (i.e. attractiveness) of a given country for 
plant investment.
As a first step in assessing a country’s attractiveness for investment, it is 
possible to draw up a comprehensive list of all factors that should be 
included in a plant location analysis. A recent example is the Price 
Waterhouse approach as described in the Financial Times Survey (reported 
by Cassell, 1993). These factors included ones such as the existence of a
^e.g. comparative abundance of skilled workers
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stable political situation in the country receiving the investment, reasonable 
labour costs, reliability of power supply, and availability of skilled workers. 
Surprisingly, availability and quality of telephone, fax and data lines waa 
ranked first, but probably reflected a strong participation of “knowledge 
intensive” firms in the survey.
Having established this list of factors, it is then possible to develop a 
simple ranking system that can be used to assess locations both across 
different countries and across different potential sites within a given 
country (e.g., the Euromoney risk assessment method, Euromoney, 1988). 
My approach has been to take a fairly comprehensive set of factors and 
group them together into four logical categories (See Figure 3.2). This 
approach enables analysis and assessment at three levels: individual 
location aspects (e.g. labour relations), broad attributes of a location (e.g. 
regulatory environment) and overall assessment.
The four specific elements of a country attractiveness assessment are as 
follows:
• Political environm ent. A government’s political stability is a major 
influence in a company’s decision to invest. This factor hais been 
instrumental in building the economies of a number of developing or 
newly industrialised Asian economies. Ironically, a stable democracy 
in the political sense (i.e. two or more robust political parties) may 
significantly undermine a country’s attractiveness because it 
introduces policy uncertainty. This is particularly true when the
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parties are relatively divergent in economic policy (e.g. France). 
Countries where there is significant risk of a military intervention or 
pohtical collapse aie naturally the least attractive.
• Economic environm ent. A country’s economic strength is a critical 
aspect of its attractiveness. High inflation or a wealc currency can 
undermine otherwise attractive country characteristics, as the 
Brazilian market has demonstrated.
• R egulatory  framework. Given these underlying factors, a country’s 
attractiveness can be enhanced or undermined by its regulatory 
freimework for investment. India, for example, has many attractive 
characteristics - such as a low cost, skilled workforce - but for years 
has undermined these features with a highly restrictive and 
bureaucratic approach to regulating foreign investment.
• C ontex tual factors. Finally, there are a whole collection of 
contextual factors that can influence a country’s attractiveness. These 
include the skill and flexibility of the labour force, the skill and 
experience of management, and a country’s access to key méirkets 
(e.g. through trading blocs). Even the local language can have 
significant impact. As Strange (1995) has noted, many Japanese 
companies have found the U.K. an attractive menrket relative to other 
European countriœ because their managers already speak Enghsh. In 
fact, a recent survey (JETRO 1992) found that this was the single 
most important criterion for selecting the U.K. among potential
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European locations.
Having laid out this framework, it is important to note that there is an 
additional aspect that must be considered; the awareness of potential 
investors of these elements. Unless this awareness exists, company decision 
makers may not even consider a given location, no matter how attractive its 
intrinsic cheiracteristics.® This factor was highlighted in a recent (January, 
1996) discussion I participated in with executives from the Australian 
Manufacturing Council. They felt strongly that one of their most 
important activities was publicising the intrinsic strength of the Australian 
environment relative to many Asian countries. Chisholm (1990) makes the 
same point by identifying promotional information as one of three primary 
ways to stimulate inward investment (his other two are initial, one off 
assistance and assistance to companies that have already set up and are in 
business)
3.2.2 A ssessm ent o f U .K . attractiveness
Having laid out the elements of a country’s attractiveness to outside 
investors, we can now assess the attractiveness of the U.K., from the
®As Foust and Mallory (1993) have documented, companies and regional policy makers 
go to great lengths to build awareness of their company and region, respectively, with 
potential investors. For example, NationsBank in Atlanta has hired models to impersonate 
characters from Gone with the Wind as a draw for potential Japanese investors. Tennessee 
recruiters take potential Japanese investors to the Grand Ole Opry in Nashville, and give 
dulcimers as gifts.
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perspective of both cost and capability based criteria.
Cost based aspects
Figure 3.3 summarizes the relative attractiveness of the U.K. to outside 
investors. This analysis is based upon work by Banham (1994), Strange 
(1995) and others.
• Political environm ent. The U.K. political environment as affects 
investment is quite strong. There is a long tradition of stable 
parliamentary democracy, and both parties strongly support inward 
investment. Clouding this attractive picture is a traditional policy 
divergence between the Conservative and Labour governments in 
political, social and regulatory aspects of investment policy. It is 
important to note that this divergence creates significant 
uncertainties over the direction of future policies, which has a 
strongly negative impact on investment (see Section 6.3.3). This 
divergence has been closing in recent years, however, which should 
make the political environment increasingly attractive to investors.
• Economic environm ent. The U.K.’s economic environment is 
moderately strong at present (e.g. reasonable economic growth, 
relatively low inflation, stable recovery in the housing market and 
supporting industries), although there have been significant periods of 
weakness in the past (e.g. the IMF intervention to protect the pound 
in the 1970s). The U.K. has traditionally been a relatively high 
inflation environment (although inflation has been much lower in
80
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reœnt years), and the property boom in the 1980s has caused long 
term damage to the housing market (which in turn drives important 
sectors of the economy). The departure of the U.K. from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism also wealcened the U.K.’s economic 
credibility with its European partners, since it represented a “U-turn” 
in a policy that the government had stated strenuously that it 
planned to pursue.
• R egulatory  framework. In general, the U.K.’s regulatory 
framework is quite favourable towards investment; the 
Thatcher/Major government in particular has adopted a strongly 
encouraging stance. The U.K. also has a long legacy of encouraging 
investment, and, as noted in Chapter 1, has often been the innovator 
in new forms of investment support.
•  C ontextual factors. In the area of contextual factors, the U.K. 
presents a range of attractive and unattractive aspects. Overall, 
however, the U.K. is relatively strong in this area. On the positive 
side, labour relations in recent years are substantially better than the 
U.K.’s traditionally poor reputation would suggest; as Banham notes, 
the number of days lost in industrial disputes in 1992 was the lowest 
since records began over a century ago. The Economist Magazine 
survey of U.K. investment ( “Why here?”) notes that a combination of 
contextual factors make the U.K. very attractive: long working hours 
(relative to the rest of the EC), weak trade unions and Britain’s 
rejection of the EC social charter. The Economist survey suggests
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that ironically, poor management quality coupled with 
underinvestm ent makes the U.K. a t tr a c t iv e  to investors, since these 
factors have led to low national productivity and therefore low wages. 
Strange (1995) follows a similar line of reasoning, when he asserts 
that “the low labour productivity apparent in much of the U.K. 
industry must also encourage the Japanese company which intends to 
establish a competitive greenfield venture with the most modern plant 
and equipment.” This interpretation, however is unusual; generally 
the perception of poor local management quality works against a 
location, since the costs of importing skilled management or training 
local personnel can be very high. The U.K. is also relatively 
unattractive in some contextual areas. For example, both the OECD 
amd the World Economic Forum (reported by Flynn et al, 1994) rank 
the U.K. near the bottom of the twenty two developed countries 
surveyed in terms of overall level of education and skills. The lEE 
survey of surveys (1992) concludes that “the U.K. workforce, apart 
from the top level, is seriously under qualified.” Banham (1994) also 
acknowledges the popular perception that British management is 
“relatively incompetent.” This view holds that at least traditionally, 
there has been a shortage of managers in the U.K. with the requisite 
skills (e.g. implementing corporate strategies through effective project 
management and corporate capability building, willingness to take 
risks, level of comfort with pay/performance linkages). This point of 
view is echoed by the lEE survey which states that management is 
improving but further gains are required to raise standards towards
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those of the best.” The 1992 Coopers & Lybrand survey identified 
three managerial factors that have contributed to the decline of 
British manufacturing, in their view: short termism by management, 
attempts to apply quick fixes and insular attitude of management.
In summary, the U.K. represents an attractive market for manufacturing 
investment, especially when it provides access to the European market 
(Banham, 1994, Flynn et al, 1994, Cassell in the Financial Times Survey, 
1993). Banham notes that the attractiveness of the U.K. has been well 
established. Forty percent of U.S. and Japanese investment in the EC over 
the last 40 years has been made in the U.K., eind much of this investment 
has been made recently; the total stock of overseas direct investment in the 
U.K. increased from i?18 billion in 1978 to £S6 billion in 1989. The U.K. 
has also been a substantial beneficiary of investment from Germany.
However, there is also some reason for concern. The OECD places the 
U.K. 13th out of 22 in a league table of overall competitiveness, behind 
Japan, Germany and the United States. This poor ranking is driven by 
some of the factors identified above (e.g. management quality, poor labour 
skills). There is also some evidence that recently the U.K. has been facing 
increasing competition in attracting investment. Collis and Noon (1994) 
identify four factors: inadequate infrastructure provision, the skills gap, 
adverse perceptions of the attitude of the workforce and weakened financial 
incentives (e.g. since the abolition of the Regional Development Grant). To 
these should also be added external factors, such as the opening of Eastern
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Europe, which has created yet more competition for investment funds. 
C apability  based aspects
In this section, the impact of investment in the U.K. on corporate 
capability building will be discussed briefly. An earlier article I co-authored 
with Andrew Bartmess identified a five step process to make plant location 
decisions incorporating the impact of the decision on corporate capabilities 
(Bartmess and Cemy, 1993). One of the main conclusions of the article was 
that co-locating key functions was critical to preserving a company’s 
capabilities. While this analysis must be performed at a company by 
company level, providing a summary of the capabilities available in the 
U.K. in different functional areas will provide some insight into the likely 
attractiveness of the U.K. from a capability building perspective.
A full analysis of the U.K.’s skills in major functional areas is beyond the 
scope of this work. However, it is helpful to identify a few of the U.K.’s 
areas of strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, the U.K. has a 
strong R&D base, driven by underlying excellence in its academic scientific 
community. Banham (1994) notes that R&D expenditure by U.K. firms has 
risen 6 % in real terms between 1981 and 1991, although the lEE survey 
(1992) concluded that the U.K. is losing grounds on patent applications. In 
the area of marketing and advertising, the U.K.’s reputation for advertising 
is stronger than its reputation for marketing. Indeed, the U.K. is generally 
recognised as a world leaHer in advertising. Traditionally, however, there 
has been limited need for close ties between marketing/advertising and
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manufacturing, so this factor alone is not likely to influence plant location 
decisions significantly.
On the negative side, the U.K.’s skills in engineering related to design 
and production are considerably weaker. One of the arguments used for 
preserving manufacturing in an economy relates to the close linkage 
between design and manufacturing skills. In other words, losing 
manufacturing capabilities tends to lead to a reduction in engineering skills. 
Given the loss in manufacturing capability in the U.K., it is not surprising 
that the U.K.’s engineering design and production design skills are 
unremarkable relative to its European neighbours.
In summary, the U.K. is only a moderately strong investment location 
when viewed from a generic capability perspective. Naturally, this analysis 
is true only in the abstract: a specific company may have great strength in 
one of the functional areas, identified as weak from a national perspective. 
Nonetheless, the investing company will need to import its own skills in 
these areas - it will not be able to leverage existing nationed strengths to 
build its own capabihties.
Given my methodology of assessing a country’s attractiveness on the 
basis of cost and capability approaches, it is worthwhile to compare it to a 
different line of thinking taken by Porter (1990). He argues that a nation’s 
competitive advantage depends upon its companies’ ability to innovate and 
upgraHe their capabilities. He proposes a framework to assess a nation’s
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competitiveness in a given industry, which he titles the “diamond of 
competitive advantage” . While there are some connections between his 
framework and mine, his emphasis is on industry groupings in a given 
country that gain competitive advantage on a global scale (e.g. Silicon 
Valley for semiconductors, the Italian tile industry). Nonetheless, to 
demonstrate the comprehensiveness of my proposed approach, it is helpful 
to articulate the linkages and show how the factors included in his approach 
ran be included in my model when relevant (i.e. Figure 3.2).
Porter identifies four factors to assess a region’s attractiveness; factor 
conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries and firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry. Porter’s “factor conditions” (e.g. existence 
of skilled labour, quality of infrastructure) are largely picked up in my 
“economic environment” section. Porter gives great emphasis in his model 
to the second element, local demand conditions as a determinant of 
competitive advantage. While this can be true in some markets (see for 
example the discussion of Applied Materials in Bartmess and Cerny, 1993), 
it is not always an important factor in investment decision making. For 
example, the attractiveness of a car plant investment in the U.K. intended 
to serve the European market is little influenced by the character of the 
English car market. To the extent that local demand conditions are 
relevant for a given market, they can be incorporated in my framework 
under contextual factors. Porter’s third element, related and supporting 
industries, is discussed above in the capability assessment approach (e.g. 
the quality of local R&D, advertising, etc.). His final element, firm strategy,
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structure and rivalry, can be very important in some industries, in that 
these elements are tightly linked with the element of local demand. 
However, as noted above, these need not necessarily be key aspects of an 
investment decision. If they happen to be, they can be incorporated in the 
contextual factors element of this framework.
3.2.3  R egional differences
Having described the U.K.’s attractiveness for investment on an aggregate 
basis, it is helpful to assess the relative strengths of England, Scotland and 
Wales. As noted in Chapter 2, the particular regional issues related to 
Northern Ireland will not be discussed in detail. This is a very brief 
overview of the relative differences, and is only intended to show that even 
at a high level, there are significant differences in overall policy approach 
across regions.
E ngland
With its dominemt financial role in the economy and especially its great 
political strength, the Southeast of England has not traditionally required 
special incentives to attract industry. Indeed, as was seen in Chapter 2, 
disincentives were put in place for many years to avoid over-concentration 
of investment in the Southeast. This has changed in the recent recession, 
when, for the first time, the Southeaist was hit especially hard by an 
economic downturn. As was also noted in Chapter 2, a number of regions in 
England have remained financially depressed for many years (e.g. the
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Midlands), despite many years of regional intervention.
Scotland
Scotland has been quite successful in attracting local investment, based in 
part through active intervention to enhance its capabilities.® For example, 
the region has put in place a number of training programs to enhance local 
skills. It also has a good network of suppliers in key industries (e.g. 
computers and high technology), and has successfully adopted a number of 
new technologies and management practices (e.g. total quality management 
and statistical process control). Scotland has attempted to implement a 
modest industrial policy via the Scottish Development Authority (now 
Scottish Enterprise), built around “sunrise industries” . However, this is a 
relatively recent trend. Halkier has found that before 1985, more than 75 % 
of the investments made by the SDA were in “traditional” Scottish 
industries like engineering, textiles and food. Only in the late 1990s did the 
percentage of investment in “modern” industries (i.e. electronics, 
biotechnology and services) account for more than 50 %. Scottish 
Enterprise has attempted to rziise awareness of its capabilities and potential 
by creating a fairly extensive network of overseas investment offices in the 
U.S., Asia, and Europe.
^This section draws upon material from Scottish Enterprise and Halkier (1992)
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W ales
As David (1992) has noted, Wales has a number of characteristics that 
make it an attractive location for manufacturing investment. These include 
low overheads, low cost labour, recent investment in infrastructure (e.g. the 
rebuilt A55 along the north Wales coast, second Severn crossing), emphasis 
on selective attraction of investment related to core competencies (e.g. 
automotive components, electronics, aerospace), new housing developments 
(e.g. in Cardiff, Bridgend) and environmental rebuilding (e.g. the Cynon 
Valley). Collis and Noon (1994) suggest that Wales’s attractiveness as a 
location for investment has been its low labour costs relative to other U.K. 
regions, generous regional assistance, new infrastructure investment and the 
general growth of the Welsh economy in relation to the U.K.
3.3 D egree o f policy influence over the  
attractiveness assessment
Government policy cannot affect all aspects of a country’s inherent 
attractiveness equally. This section provides a brief discussion of 
government influence over each of the four main elements of a country’s 
attractiveness (i.e. Figure 3.2). In this way, it provides a linkage between 
the government policy levers identified in Chapter 2 and the perspective of 
a potential investing company.
• Political environm ent. The government has a moderate to low 
level of influence over the political environment (as defined in this
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framework). The broad features of English parliamentary democracy 
are unlikely to change significantly, particularly to meet the needs of 
investment pohcy, although clearly the government’s overall attitude 
towards inward investment will depend upon the incumbent party.
• Economic environm ent. The government has significantly more 
ability to influence the economic environment, although the overall 
level is still only moderately high. While the government can influence 
the freedom of the market and currency convertibility, it cannot easily 
control the overall stabihty of the economy (as evidenced by the 
efforts of various Chancellors over the years to transform the economy 
from its inflationary, recession prone behaviour). The government s 
current fiscal woes create another significant constraint in improving 
the quality of the infrastructure, which arguably could improve the 
attractiveness of the U.K. for investors.
• R egulatory  framework. The government has a high degree of 
ability to influence the regulatory framework, in that the government 
directly controls nearly every aspect of it. Despite this control, the 
framework appears to change only very slowly. As noted in Section 
2.2, regional policy and investment policy have shown a remarkable 
degree of persistence over five eras of regional policy spanning 60 
years; by implication, governments have felt unwilling or unable to
lOThis is infrastructure broadlyTefined «  in Section 2,4.1 above. It includes traditional 
elements such as roads, rail and telecommunications, but also includes “lifestyle” oriented 
elements such as quality of parks, hospitals, civic buildings, etc.
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influence the regulatory framework significantly. The increasing power 
of the EC has also created some constraints (e.g. caps on investment 
subsidies, encouragement of the U.K. to adopt the Social Charter).
•  C on tex tual factors. The government has a moderate degree of 
influence over contextual factors. While in theory the government can 
influence the quality of education, the skill of the research base and 
some aspects of management talent (e.g. through education policy), 
in practice it is extremely difficult to influence these factors effectively 
on a national scale. Some contextual factors are dependent only on 
the U.K.’s history and geographical location - i.e. English language 
being spoken and easy access bang available to markets on the 
continent. Some further factors are inherently external, in that what 
is of interest to investors is the U.K.’s relative attractiveness when 
compared with its European neighbours. Thus while the U.K. 
government may have some influence over the quahty of labour 
relations in the U.K., it can do little to influence the state of 
labour-management relations in other European countries.
Section 3.2.1 noted that awareness of a country’s attractiveness also has a 
significant impact on corporate investment, and the rœources required to 
fund promotional campaigns are under direct government control. In times 
of increasing fiscal constraint, however, the government may feel hampered 
in its ability to fund significant promotional campaigns for inward 
investment.
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3.4 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has explored two key aspects of the overseas plant location 
investment decision: how companies make investment decisions and how 
they assess the inherent attractiveness of a particular location. It has 
discussed decision making based on both pure cost and capability based 
models, and has differentiated between rational and “behavioural” decision 
making. For my purposes, it will be assumed that all capability based 
elements can be assigned a cost, and that companies then make a rational 
decision on whether or not to invest based on the economic merits of the 
particular investment. The second half of this chapter has developed and 
discussed a framework for assessing a country’s attractiveness for inward 
investment, and has applied it to the U.K:. The framework has confirmed 
that the U.K. has a moderate to high degree of attractiveness across the 
four key elements of the framework; this attractiveness has been reflected in 
the high level of overseas investment in the U.K.. The chapter concludes 
with a brief discussion of some of the regional differences between England, 
Scotland and Wales, and an analysis of the government’s ability to 
influence factors affecting its attractiveness to overseas investors.
Drawing on the assumptions mentioned above. Chapter 4 that follows 
summarises the traditional financial approach companies use to evaluate 
investments, and then shows how this approach may be extended to 
incorporate recent research in investment decision making under 
uncertainty.
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C hapter 4 
Firm  Investm ent D ecision  
M aking
The previous chapter described some important aspects of firm investment 
decision making, and identified two key assumptions that will hold for the 
remainder of this thesis. First, it stated the assumption that firm decision 
making will be considered to be “rational” : investments are made solely on 
the basis of the true underlying economics. Second, it noted the assumption 
that all capability oriented factors may be incorporated into a financial 
model to describe those economics. This chapter summarises how firms 
currently use Net Present Value (NPV) analysis to assess investments, and 
then describes an original five step process which links together traditional 
NPV analysis with the findings from the McDonald and Siegel (1986) work.
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4.1 N et Present Value Analysis
This section summarises the five steps in Net Present Value analysis (see 
Brealey and Myers, 1991 for a good overview of the subject). NPV analysis 
essentially assumes that an investment is a bond, i.e. it pays a periodic 
return to its investors. As will be discussed later, this assumption neglects 
an important aspect of an investment: its option value. While there is 
considerable practical subtlety in performing an NPV analysis, the 
underlying methodology is easy to articulate:
1. E stim ate  th e  cash flows. In many NPV analyses, it is assumed 
that the investment continues to pay a return in perpetuity; we will follow 
this approach here since the McDonald Siegel methodology makes a similar 
assumption. For practical reasons, however, detailed estimates are usually 
made of the likely revenues and expenses of a given investment for a specific 
period of years (typically between 5 and 20 years), and then broad 
assumptions are made regarding the behaviour of the invœtment following 
this period. The detailed revenues and expenses in the initial period are 
adjusted for non-cash items (e.g. depreciation and amortisation), and any 
tax benefits and working capital requirements can be included. We can 
denote the resulting cash flows as CFi, where i is the year which varies 
between 0 and n. For the cash flows from year n H-1 to infinity, it is then 
assumed that CFn+i = CFn x ( l +  gY for all i > 0, where ^ is an annual 
growth rate. In other words, cash flows beyond the final year grow at a 
constant rate (which may be 0).
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2. E stablish  a d iscount rate . Next, a discount rate r  is established. 
This rate reflects the investing company’s cost of capital, i.e. cost of funds 
used to make investments. It is typically estimated by computing the 
weighted average of a company’s cost of debt and cost of equity.
3. C om pute  te rm in a l value. The next step is to compute the 
“terminal value”, i.e. the value of the cash flows from the year n +  1 to 
infinity. The terminal value is usually computed as follows:
CP
Terminal value (TV) = ----—, (4.1)r - g
where g is the growth rate.
4. D iscount th e  cash flows back to  th e  present. Using the discount 
rate, the future cash flows (including the terminal value) are discounted 
back to their value in today’s money. Specifically, we create the sum
rp-w *=n-l f t  p
Valueo =  +  g  ( Y r t ÿ '
where Valueo refers to the total value of the cash flow streams, discounted 
back to the present.
5. S u b trac t in itial investm ent to  com pute N PV . Once we have 
computed the value of the future cash flow streams at time t =  0, we can 
then coirgpare it to the required investment cost I. The decision rule is 
simple: “Invest if Valueo — I  greater than 0.”
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The essential characteristic of this approach is that it leads to a decision 
rule about investing today, i.e. invest if the value of the discounted cash 
flows is greater than the cost of the initial investment. The method yields 
no information about what point in tim e to invest to achieve optimal 
returns. In addition, the cash flows are deterministic, i.e. they must be 
defined precisely for each year in the analysis. While there are some 
technical ways around this problem (e.g. Monte Carlo based simulation), 
these approaches do not address the problem that NPV analysis provides 
no inform ation On the Optimal tim e to  invest.
4.2 Firm  decision meiking including  
stochastic elem ents
Traditional NPV analysis cannot easily accommodate two types of 
elements: economic veniables based upon geometric Brownian motion with 
drift and events that can be modeled by Poisson processes. Both of these 
are important in modeling the potential benefits of a given investment in an 
uncertain world.
4.2.1 G eom etric Brownian m otion w ith  drift
Geometric Brownian motion with drift céin be used to model variables that 
cannot be predicted with certainty, e.g. exchange rates, parts costs and 
labour costs. While it is possible to incorporate random elements in an 
NPV analysis (e.g. by simulating multiple trials using a computer
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programme such as At Risk), the end result is still a decision rule on 
whether or not to invest today, not a decision rule on when in time it is 
most advantageous to invest.
For the purposes of this research, uncertain economic variables will be 
modeled using geometric Brownian motion with drift. In other words, for a 
variable x, dx would be given by:
dx =  Qxdt + (Txdzj
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process. In this equation, a  
represents the trend in the value of the variable, i.e. the expected linear 
increase over time. The other main parameter, a, represents the expected 
volatility of the variable. The greater the value for cr, the greater the 
uncertainty of the variable over time. The parameters a and a can be 
estimated by reviewing historical data. Appendix A.l describes these types 
of random variable in greater detail.
4.2.2 Poisson processes
Poisson processes can be used to model a second type of random variables, 
i.e. variables that make infrequent but discrete jumps. They axe 
particularly relevant to this research in that they can be used to model a 
shift in policy, e.g. a change in tax rates or introduction of a minimum 
wage. These types of jump processes can be mcorpora-ted in a. traditional 
NPV analysis by considering a “decision tree” with multiple possibilities. 
As before, however, the NPV analysis only reveals whether or not the
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investment has a positive return if made today, not when in time it is 
optimal to invest.
The specific mathematical treatment is as follows. If 9 is a Poisson 
process, then:
0 with probability 1 — Adf, /.
uq with probability \d t  \ ^
In other words, there is a A % probability that the value in q will drop to 
u% of 9 , where 0 < u < 1. Poisson processes are discussed in greater detail 
in Appendix A.4.
4.3 M cDonald Siegel m odel
McDonald and Siegel (1986) developed an approach that describes a 
decision rule for investments that have values that vary according to 
geometric Brownian motion processes with drift.^ Their analysis provides a 
significant improvement over traditional NPV analysis, in that it allows the 
investor to review the market situation regularly and choose the optimal 
time to invest. The difference between traditional NPV analysis and their 
approach is summarized in Figure 4.1. The left hand side of the chart 
summarizes the key steps in computing a NPV analysis and shows the
^The actual analysis also allowed the investment cost I  to vary stochastically as well. 
For the purposes of this research, however, it is assumed that I  does not vary in real terms 
(i.e. has parameters a =  0 and cr = 0). This is a more realistic assumption in plemt 
locations, where the cost of investment is relatively constant in real terms.
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(static) decision rule. The right hand side of the chart shows the McDonald 
Siegel approach. First, a threshold value is computed that is larger than the 
base investment, I. Next, the actued vcilue of the investment is monitored 
over time. When the current value exceeds the threshold value, the 
company invests, thereby ensuring the optimal return. Each of these steps 
entails considerable nuance, and will be described in detail in Section 4.4.
McDonald and Siegel’s breakthrough was to derive an equation that 
could be used to compute the critical ratio - C* - which reflects the ratio of 
the required investment value divided by the initial investment, I. In 
computing this ratio, they assumed that the value of the investment V  
could be modeled by geometric Brownian motion with drift, i.e. could be 
described by stating the two parameters a and a. In their analysis, a 
company should invest at the first point in time when V  =  f{ t)  exceeds the 
critical ratio C* x I. They derived an expression for C* as follows:
where /? is given by
a  11 2 + ^  > 0 (4.5)(JLa2 2J
A detailed exposition of this analysis is given in Appendix A.
Having determined this equation, it is possible to identify the relationship 
between parameters ol and <j and C* (See Figure 4.2). For a fixed a, the 
critical ratio increases sharply with a. Thus for an a  of .02 and a <7 of 20 %
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(a figure equivalent to the volatility of the stock market as a whole), the 
critical ratio is more than 2.0. From an economic perspective, the higher 
the volatility, the greater the possibility that the investment characteristics 
will change dramatically in the future. Therefore, in order to be sure that 
the best possible return is achieved, a company should only invest today if 
the current NPV is high (reflected by the increase in the critical ratio).
When a  is varied, the same overall shape of the curve is preserved, but is 
shifted upwards: as a  increases, the critical ratio increases. This behaviour 
reflects the fact that a positive a results in increasing value of the 
investment over time. The higher the value of a, the greater the value in 
waiting to invest (i.e. to reap the benefit of increased future value), and 
therefore the higher the criticed ratio.
4.4 Linking N P V  analysis to  M cDonald  
Siegel
For the McDonald Siegel algorithm to be practical in real world decision 
making, some extensions to the approach are required. Their algorithm 
assumes that the value of the investment V  varies stochastically over time. 
Corporate decision makers, on the other hand, think in terms of the Net 
Present Value of a given decision. This section describes an original five 
step process which makes the required linkage (Figure 4.3). In essence, it 
provides an algorithm that permits the estimation of a  and <r for a given
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investment. The McDonald Siegel analysis may then be apphed to 
determine the critical ratio.
The five required steps aire described in detail in the following 
sub-sections.
4.4.1 M odel cash flows
Suppose we are considering malcing an investment 7 in a project that will 
generate revenues and expenses as represented below in Table 4.1. For the
Table 4.1: Sample cash flows from simple investment
1995 1996 1997
Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0
Labour expenses 40.2 38.6 37.0
Non-Labour 20.0 20.0 20.0
Profit 39.8 41.4 43.0
Costi = Costt_i(l +  a  -f adz)
purposes of the cash flow model, each variable is assumed to follow 
Geometric Browniam motion with drift, i.e. to be in the form 
dV = aVdt 4- aVdz. To model variables that are constant in real terms, 
such as sales in this example, the parameters a  and a are both set to 0. 
The model excludes any Poisson processes; these will be discussed later in 
Section 4.4.6.
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4.4.2 E stim ate overall param eters a  and cr
In the second step, we simulate a suite of trials to determine the value of 
the investment over time, V{t). These values are calculated by using a ten 
year horizon and a terminal value. An average a  is computed across the 
entire suite of trials; a can then be computed for each trial and an overall 
average taken. The parameters may then be used as the madn parameters 
in the McDonald Siegel equation used to estimate C*.
Deriving expressions for the estimate of the main parameters is 
straightforward. We first write the formula dV =  aVdt -f aVdz in terms of 
finite differences as Ain V =  otAt + crAz. Since expectation is a linear 
operator, we can write:
£(AlnV) = a5(At)-H (t£(Az)
= a  since 6"(At) = 1 and S{Az) =  0
Next, we note that Var(AIn V) = Cov (AIn V, AinF) .  Then we can 
write:
Cov( A In V, A In V) = Cov(aAf 4- cAz, a  At 4- <t A z )
= o? Cov(Af, A^) 4- 2a<7 Cov(A<, Az) 4- cP" Cov(Az, Az)
Next we note that:
Cov(Af, At) — 0 since A t deterministic (4.6)
Cov(At, Az) = 0 since At and Az uncorrelated (4.7)
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Cov( Az, Az) =  At from the definition of Brownian motion (4.8) 
Therefore, Var(Aln V) = P A t  =  P  for At = 1
Thus for a given trial of n years, we can write:
In v„ — In Ui
a  =
(7
n
(4.9)
These two equations are used to estimate the average a  and a for the 
overall investment across the suite of trials. They are also used to estimate 
the parameters for historical data used as inputs to the cash flow analysis 
(e.g. to compute the historical volatility and trend of labour rates).^
One issue is that since a  and a are estimates, it is important to estimate 
the size of the error bars on these variables. In general,
standard deviation of a
n
-----------------:—;------------- y/n
standard deviation of a
A sensitivity analysis of the impact on the number of trials on the overall 
estimate for a  is shown in Section 5.7.
^See Section 5.4.
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4.4.3 C om pute resulting C*
The third step is to compute the overall critical ratio, based upon a  and a. 
This is straightforward, relying upon the fact that:
C* =  (4.11)
where ^  is given by equation 4.5.
4.4.4  C om pute nominal value in current tim e period
The fourth step is to compute the value of the investment over time, in 
order to apply the investment rule. A set of random numbers is generated, 
in order to determine the “actual” path for the three main variables in the 
model (sales, labour costs and non-labour costs). For each year, the current 
value V  of the investment needs to be estimated. The equation used is:
V = - ^ ,  (4.12)
r — a
where CFi represents the cashflow in year i. This expression follows 
directly from traditional NPV analysis. Since the expected value of any 
geometric Brownian variable is independent of <r, that term does not
appear in this equation. The above equation is therefore parallel with the
equation for estimating the terminal value in traditional NPV analysis (i.e. 
equation 4.1).
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4.4.5 A pply decision rule
Now, the formal decision rule may be applied. Eaxdi year (or any regular 
time period), the company checks to see if:
y  > c" X /,
where V  is given by equation 4.12. K so, the company invests at that point. 
If not, it waits until the next time period and reappHes the rule.
4.4.6 Overlay o f Poisson processes
It is possible to overlay multiple Poisson processes over the approach 
described above (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, extended by the analysis in 
Appendix A). This overlay can then incorporate the impact, for example, of 
a 10% probabihty per year of a drop of 20% in the value of the investment. 
We can use the method shown in Appendix A.4, and the following equation 
to calculate the impact on C*.
-  1) +  -  (r +  ^  A.) +  g  A.(l -  =  0, (4.13)
^ i i .
where A,- and <j>i are the two parameters used to define a total of i distinct 
Poisson events. Simple numerical solutions may then be used to solve for /S. 
Once /3 is known, C* may be computed. Some detailed case examples using 
this technique will be developed in section 6.3.3.
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4.4 .7  Linkage betw een company hurdle rates and  
cost o f capital
The McDonald Siegel analysis also helps to resolve an open question 
relating to traditional Net Present Value anailysis: why company hurdle 
rates^ used in NPV analysis are so much higher than their true cost of 
capital. As Dixit (1992) has noted, “observers of business practice find that 
such hurdle rates axe three or four times the cost of capital.” He finds that 
it is possible to incorporate a new discount or hurdle rate that takes 
account of the value of waiting. In fact, the adjusted cost of capital p* can 
be found as:
where p is the cost of capital as described in Section 4.1. As he notes, “even 
when the cost of capital is as low as 5 percent per year, the value of waiting 
can easily lead to adjusted hurdle rates of 10 to 15 percent.” It can be 
shown that Dixit’s approach wid the five step method described above 
based on McDonald Siegel are the same; one adjusts the discount rate and 
one creates a new investment threshold. While this approach is unhkely to 
reflect the entire explanation for the disparity between NPV theory and 
common business practice, it does provide a thought provoking rationale for 
why company investments are apparently made too conservatively.
®The “hurdle rate” is the m in im um  financial return a company will accept in order to 
fund a given investment
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4.5 Sum m ary
This chapter has laid some important technical groundwork for the work 
that follows. It began with a brief discussion of traditional NPV analysis, 
and noted two important types of elements that cannot easily be 
incorporated into NPV analysis: variables that can be described by 
geometric Brownian motion and Poisson type events. Next, the chapter 
described the McDonald and Siegel (1986) algorithm and developed a five 
step process to link traditional NPV analysis with their approach. The 
chapter concluded by indicating how the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
algorithm may be used to incorporate Poisson events in the five step 
approach. This topic will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6 .
Chapter 5 that follows describes an analytical model, based upon 
fieldwork with Kodak, that incorporates the five step process described 
here. Chapters 4 and 5 therefore provide the analytical tools required for 
identification and analysis of potential new policy instruments in Chapter 6 .
I l l
C hapter 5
K odak Investm ent M odel
The previous chapter outhned the detailed mathematical theory required to 
link traditional NPV analysis with the McDonald Siegel approach. This 
chapter describes five major areas; the conceptual design of a computer 
model based upon this theory; the approach used to estimate sales revenues 
and the expense cost structure; the actual model design and structure; the 
methodology used to eslimaie key parameters; and a discussion of a sample 
printout of the model (including potential enhancements).
5.1 C onceptual design o f com puter m odel
In order to test the new policy instruments discussed in Chapter 6 , a 
detailed case example of an investment decision was required. This section 
describes the approach used to develop a computer model based upon this 
case example, and some key simplifying assumptions.
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5.1.1 D evelopm ent o f the Kodak m odel
To provide “real life” numbers for the investment decision model, I 
selected the example of a Kodak investment decision that was in the public 
domain (i.e. a Harvard Business School case written by myself and Andrew 
Bartmess, 1992). This publication was based upon extensive fieldwork that 
we conducted in 1991 with the Kodak Business Imaging Systems Division 
operation in Rochester, NY. To preserve the confidentiahty of Kodak 
proprietary data, I have disguised any data relevant to the investment 
model that were not already in the public domain (e.g. actual level of R&D 
spend). In doing this, I have been careful to ensure that none of the 
adjusted information would have any material impact on the potential 
investment decision analysis.
The original case example described the decision making process of senior 
management at Kodak’s Business Imaging System Division (BIS), who 
were considering relocating manufacturing operations from relatively 
high-cost Rochester to a low cost Asian location. BIS designed, 
manufactured, marketed and sold microfilm readers and printers, ranging 
from small desktop units to large units capable of serving a large 
commercial bank. Although the division had traditionally been quite 
successful, based in part on the strength of the Kodak brand name, it had 
been coming under increasing pressure from low-cost Asian manufacturers.
For the purposes of this thesis, the Kodak case has been adapted to 
reflect a greenfield investment. This change has been made to reflect the
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fact that the U.K. is more hkely to attract new investment than purely 
cost-based relocations, given that its labour costs are relatively high (e.g. 
when compared with Thailand). From a financial modeling perspective, 
this change has relatively little impact, however; the same computer model 
can be used to evaluate greenfield investments or plant relocations.
The specific product selected for the analysis was the one referred to as 
“Capture I” in the Kodak case. Capture I was a low cost, high volume 
product that would be a logical candidate for either a cost based relocation 
or a greenfield investment seeking an attractive location.
5.1.2 Sim plifying assum ptions in m odel
The original investment model w2ls highly complex (See “Model Note” by 
Cerny and Bartmess, 1992), since it was intended to capture nearly all 
aspects of the investment decision in detail (e.g. expatriate support, fine 
gradations of duty costs, etc.) Incorporating this level of detail in the 
pohcy instrument analysis ran the risk of obscuring the underlying 
economics, however, and therefore the investment decision model was 
simplified in several ways:
• Incom e sta tem en t. At the core of every investment decision model 
is a cash flow analysis that describes the expected cash flow from the 
investment. For the purposes of this analysis, the cash flow statement 
was simplified to include just three variables: sales, labour costs and 
non-labour costs (e.g. optical and mechanical parts).
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•  Types of variables considered. In computing the hkely cash flows 
over time, it was assumed that all three variables foUowed geometric 
Brownian motion with drift. This allowed variables to be held 
constant in real terms, if desired, by setting a  and <7 to 0. The same 
model could also be used to incorporate variables following other 
types of random motion, if desired.
•  Approach to  taxation . The impact of a profits tax was included in 
the model, although no effort was made to model more sophisticated 
aspects of taxation such as tax carryforwards and carrybacks.
Despite these simphfications, the resulting model displays considerable 
analytical richness. It also provides enough detail that it could be applied 
to more complex situations (although at a cost in loss of clarity on the 
impact of uncertainty on the underlying economics).
5.2 Estim ating sales revenues and  
underlying cost structure
One of the key analyses in the model design was the conversion of the 
overall economics of the investment decision into the three elements 
described above: sales, labour based costs and non-labour based costs. 
Figure 5.1 shows the result of this analysis. Out of a total selling price of 
100 (on an index basis), labour driven costs accounted for 35% of the total 
and non-labour driven costs accounted for 55% of the total, yielding a
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profit of 10%.  ^ These figures were then used in the cash flow model.
To develop these figures, an analysis was conducted of the key elements 
of the Kodak cost structure. These were total profit, R&D spend, 
marketing and sales spend, and manufacturing spend. For each of these 
elements, the proportion of total cost attributable to both labour driven 
costs and non-labour driven costs was estimated. To perform this analysis, 
data from Kodak and public data from competitors were used. Specific 
results were as follows:
• Total profit. The simple analysis of profitability of Kodak and 
competitors (e.g. Canon, Anacomp, AGFA) showed a return on sales 
(i.e. pre-tax profit divided by sales) of only 5%. However, the market 
was particularly competitive during the period of time reflected by 
the data (i.e. 1985 to 1990), and therefore a pre-tax ROS of 10% was 
selected to be modeled. This is more typical of successful 
mamufacturing companies.
• R&D. Although analysis of Kodak and competitor data showed a 
fairly wide variation in R&D spend, a figure of 5% was selected as 
being typical. R&D was assumed to be heavily labour cost driven, 
and therefore a 75:25 split was assumed between labour driven and 
non-labour driven elements. This 75:25 split implied that R&D’s 
contribution to the total cost structure was therefore 3 .75% labour 
driven and 1.25% non-labour driven.
 ^These numbers were rounded to the nearest 5%
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# M arketing  and  Sales. Marketing and Sales reflected approximately 
20% of the total sales price. This expense was assumed to be split 
65:35 between labour and non-labour, to reflect the people intensity 
of that part of the business. This implied that labour-cost driven 
Marketing and Sales expenditure represented 13% of the total cost 
structure and non-labour cost driven expenditure represented 7%.
•  M anufacturing  spend. By analyzing Kodak and competitor data, 
it was determined that the cost of manufacture was approximately 
65% of the total selling price. The split between labour and
non-labour driven costs is described in detail below.
Having analysed each major cost element at a top level, the next step 
was to identify the split between direct labour and non-direct labour for the 
manufacturing costs. This split was calculated using data from the original 
fieldwork and the Harvard Business School case (Figure 5.2). Labour costs, 
both hourly and salaried, were assumed to be comparably volatile, and 
were assumed to account for 10% of total cost. Parts were assumed to be 
driven by non-labour costs from the perspective of the investing company, 
and represented 65% of the total cost structure. Overhead contributed 25% 
to the total manufacturing cost, and was eissumed to be split 60:40 between 
labour and non-labour to reflect the significant fixed costs associated with 
manufacturing the equipment (e.g. in tooling). These assumptions were 
supported by data in the case and interviews conducted when the case was 
being written.
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5.3 M odel design and structure
A detailed computer spreadsheet model of the Kodak investment decision 
was constructed, that incorporated the analytical techniques described in 
Chapter 4 (Figure 5.3). Specific elements of the model were as follows:
• Cash flow analysis. At the heart of the model was a traxiitional 
cash fiow analysis, incorporating the three cost elements noted above 
(i.e. revenue, labour driven costs, non-labour driven costs). The 
model permitted up to five variables to be included, and each variable 
was modeled independently based upon the two parameters required 
to define geometric Brownian motion with drift. Twenty years of 
random variables were forecast, and ten years of Net Present Values 
were computed by summing the discounted value of ten years of a 
simulated series of cash fiows, plus a discounted termincd value.
• In p u t param eters. Each forecast variable requires the usual two 
parameters to define it: a  and a. To estimate these, a two step 
process was used that is described in detail in Section 5.4.
• R andom  num ber generator. Based upon the mathematical 
techniques dœcribed in Appendix A.5, a macro driven random 
number generator was included that produced the required 
normalized distribution.
• R andom  num ber library . Because computations of the required 
random numbers were very time intensive (up to 8 hours for a full set
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on a 33 MHz Compaq 486), a library of 10 sets of random numbers 
was created. This approach had two benefits. First, it reduced the 
required run time per simulation from approximately 8 hours to 5 
minutes. Second, it allowed more precise comparisons between 
different policy instruments, since the calculations could be based 
upon the same random variables (if required).
M acro engine. Since calculating the overall parameters required 
running multiple trials (up to 100 or more) to generate average 
values, a macro “engine” was added to the spreadsheet to manage the 
overall simulations. The macro engine also accessed random numbers 
from the library or generated new ones as required.
R un param eters. The macro engine had three main parameters. 
The first controlled the number of trials in each simulation that were 
executed to produce the overall average parameter values. The second 
and third parameters controlled the number of random numbers 
produced by defining the row and column widths of the matrix to be 
filled.
O u tp u t param eter estim ation. Estimating the output parameters 
relied upon equations 4.9 and 4.10, but provided three options in how 
the average a  was computed across simulations. One option held a  
fixed at 0. The next option subtracted the average a  in each 
simulation run from the logarithm pairs used to calculate <r in 
equation 4.10. The final option computed an overedl a  across the
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entire suite of trials, and used this a  to calculate a. The analysis in 
Chapter 6 rehed upon the third approach, since it produced the most 
consistent results of the three. This is because the first was relevant 
only for special cases (e.g. when the drift value for all three input 
variables was 0). The second approach ran the risk that small errors 
in calculating as for each trial in the suite would lead to errors in 
estimating as for each trial.
• Decision rule. The general decision rule, as noted earlier, is to 
invest when the current year NPV estimate exceeds the required 
threshold value. This portion of the model incorporated two 
calculations. First, it computed the value of C* and therefore the 
vedue of the threshold. Second, it captured the evolution of value over 
time so that the investment point could be selected.
• C ost of subsidy calculations. The final section of the model 
computed the year by year and average cost to the government of the 
volatility minimisation instrument. The detailed calculation 
techniques employed will be described in detail in Section 6.3.1.
5.4 Econom ic parameter estim ation
To estimate the two parameters for key economic variables (e.g. labour 
cost), a two step approach was used. First, a  and a were computed for 
these variables based upon published real economic data from CSO 
Economic Trends. To do this, equations 4.9 and 4.10 were used, computed
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over two different time periods. Three of the variables were expressed in 
nominal terms (i.e. producer price index, “cable” exchange rate® and 
exchange rate index), and so required conversion to real terms by dividing 
by the appropriate inflation index. Four variables in all were selected for 
detailed examination (Table 5 .1):
• Average m anufacturing earnings. The CSO baseline 
manufacturing earnings data are seasonally adjusted, which tends to 
flatten the true volatility. To reverse this flattening, an index was 
created that compared unadjusted and seasonally adjusted series of 
the producer price index. This index was then applied to the raw 
manufacturing earnings data. While the trend figure was unchanged 
in the 15 year period, it changed slightly in the 10 year period. More 
importantly, the true volatility rose significantly to .047 and .045 for 
the two periods.
• P roducer price index. The volatility and trend were estimated for 
the producer price index, i.e. the average cost of goods used in 
manufacturing. Here the trend and volatilities were quite similar over 
the two time periods (-.037 vs. -.052 and .057 vs. .053, respectively).
• Cable exchange rate. The average volatility of the “cable” 
exchange rate was computed, since approximately 50% of sales from 
the Kodak plant were to the U.S. market. Although the trend figure 
was quite different for the two periods (-.088 vs. -.019), the
2“Cable is shorthand for the U.S. dollar to English pound exchange rate
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underlying volatility was very similar (.118 vs. .121)
• Exchange ra te  index. The trend and volatility was also estimated 
for two different periods for a basket of European currencies. As in 
the cable exchange rate calculation, the volatilities were very similar 
across two time periods (.072 vs. .079), and the trend was much 
closer (-.084 vs. -.067).
Having determined the parameters for the key macroeconomic variables, 
the second step was to incorporate these parameters into the three variables 
used in the model described above. Table 5.2 shows the assumptions made 
for the three key cash flow elements. The parameters for labour-based costs
Table 5.2: Parameters used in Kodak model
<j OL Rationale
Sales
Labour costs 
Non-labour costs
.08
.047
.057
0
.021
-.037
Average of cable, sterling indices 
Based on historical data 
Based on historical data
and non-labour based costs were based directly from the data found in 
Table 5.1. The fifteen year time period was selected to minimize errors from 
fitting data to a shorter period. Setting parameters for the sales variable 
required some additional analysis. A typical startup will show great 
volatility in sales as it enters the market. A plant relocation will show much 
less volatility, assuming that the products produced at the previous 
location were already well established in the market. For the purposes of
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this model, it was assumed that the sales trend would be zero in real terms, 
i.e. that there would be no overall growth ahead of inflation. A flgure of .08 
was selected for the volatility, which reflects the volatility of the index of 
European currencies. As will be seen below, even this relatively low level 
(e.g. versus .12 for the cable exchange rate) has a signiflcant impact on a 
company’s likelihood to invest.®
5.5 M odel printout and discussion
This section begins with a detailed description of the computer model used 
to assess the policy instruments in Chapter 6 . It then describes some 
sensitivity analysis used to estimate the number of trials required per suite, 
and concludes with a brief discussion of some potential reflnements to the 
model.
5.5.1 Sam ple output and discussion
A printout of a sample run of the model is shown in Appendix C. The 
elements of the computer model are as follows:
• Cashflow sim ulation. Page C-1 of Appendix C contains a number 
of key elements of the overall simulation:
®It is important to note that actual currency risk may be hedged wholly or partially 
using financial instruments. The volatility figure selected is intended to be a proxy for 
volatility in sades.
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-  Main parameters. The “fit period select” variable controls how 
long a simulation period is used. In all trials, the value of the 
prospective investment is computed over a ten year period plus a 
terminal value. The variable “WACC” refers to the weighted 
average cost of capital in real terms; a figure of 1% was selected 
as being typical. The tax rate used is 33.25%. The model is 
constructed in real terms, and therefore the figure for inflation is 
set to zero.
-  Cashflow model. The key element of the first page is the cashflow 
estimate. These cashflow estimates are used to estimate the 
value over time from the investing company’s perspective. Each 
value is calculated based on a ten year series of simulated cash 
flows, plus a discounted terminal value (See equation 4.2).
-  Random number set. This page transfers random numbers from 
the matrix on page C-8. The variable “random number offset” is 
used to select which random numbers are used from the matrix 
for each random number set. The “number of variables” figure 
controls how many stochastic variables are modeled, in this case 
three.
-  Trend and volatility parameters. The table at the bottom of the 
page summarizes the a and a  used for each random variable.
G overnm ent cost calculation. The page used to compute the 
government subsidy for the volatility minimisation instrument is 
shown on page C-2 of the Appendix. The “base case” reflects the
128
original simulated figures shown on page C-1. Here the subsidy being 
modeled is found by setting the volatiHty of labour and non-labour 
cost to zero. By computing the difference between labour and 
non-labour cost between the base case and the government subsidy 
case, it is possible to calculate the 10 year cost of the subsidy. By 
re-running the model and setting the volatility for the labour cost and 
non-labour cost to 0 (i.e. on page C-1), it is possible to compute the 
resulting new critical ratio. Section 6.2.2 discusses this analytical 
approach in more detail.
• M odel inputs. Page C-3 includes three model inputs. “Simul” is the 
number of simulation runs in the suite. Variables P and Q determine 
the size of the random number matrix that is generated (Page C-8).
• V aluation ou tpu ts. Page C-4 stores the value streams for each 
successive run in the suite of trials. The alpha column shows the a  of 
each particular stream  of values. T he average alpha figure averages all 
the as across the suite of trials. The two values at the top of the 
page, “Invest in year 0” and “Invest before yezir 10” are used to 
monitor the investment rate given the initial investment I.
• A lpha and sigm a calculation. Page C-5 computes the logarithm 
pairs using the a  selected (See equation 4.10). As noted earher, the 
user may select three different types of fitting for alpha in the a 
calculation. In the actual trials in this thesis, the average a  across the 
suite of trials is used in the logeurithm pairs. This page then computes
129
the average a used to compute the critical ratio (See page C-6 ).
• O u tpu t values - main param eters. Page C-6 incorporates the 
overall output of the model. It allows the user to select the a  fit 
method, restates the a  and a used, and computes C*. The next three 
variables. Beta 1 , R and Delta, are all internal figures used to 
calculate C* (See equation 4.5). The threshold value represents the 
base investment 7 multiplied by the critical ratio. The string of years 
and threshold variables reflect the simulation of “reahty”. The “initial 
government investment” is the difference between the Year 0 
valuation and the threshold value. Figure 5.4 shows a sample printout 
of the investment opportunity, showing an investment between years 3 
and 4; this figure corresponds to Simulation 1 in Table 6.3 in Section 
6.2 .2 .
•  . Subsidy cost. Page C-7 stores the subsidy costs for the volatility 
minimisation instrument analysis for each trial in the suite (where 
relevant).
•  R andom  num ber generator. Page C-8 contains an excerpt of the 
random number matrix. The average figure and standard deviation 
figures are used to check the shape of the distribution. As noted in 
Appendix A.5, the algorithm used should produce a set of figures 
with an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The figures shown 
on this page have an average of 0.000098 and a standard deviation of 
.999942, both of which are within acceptable limits.
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•  M acro code. Page C-9 contains the primary macro code for the 
simulation model. It generates the random number variables (if not 
accessed from the library), computes the value series for each trial in 
the suite, and copies it to the output matrix. The subroutine at the 
bottom of the page computes the random number matrix based on 
the algorithm in Appendix A.5, when required.
• Secondary macros. Page C-10 contains two simple macros that are 
used to import and export a matrix of numbers from the random 
number library, when required .
• Variables. Page C-11 contains the cells used by the spreadsheet for 
the main variables in the macro (e.g. controlling loops, generating the 
random numbers, etc.).
5.5.2 Sensitiv ity  o f parameter estim ates
To determine the sensitivity of the model to the number of trials used, 10 
sets of simulations were run, each with 25, 50 and 100 trials in the suite. 
Using 100 trials per suite significantly reduced the standard deviation of 
the average computed C* across the simulations from 0.730 in 25 trial runs 
to 0.177 in 100 trial runs (Table 5.3). Based on this analysis, each suite of 
trials used in the analysis in Chapter 6 contained 100 trials.
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5.5.3 P otentia l enhancem ents to m odel
This model could be extended to incorporate three additional types of 
elements, although at the cost of some loss of clarity in the economic 
analysis of the policy instruments:
e D epreciation. The cash flow impact from depreciation typically 
includes a series of tax benefits, due to the deductibility of 
depreciation for tax purposes. This effect could be incorporated by 
deducting the NPV of this “tax shield” from the initial investment I.
• W orking capital. In a typical cash flow model, working capital is 
assumed to vary directly with the change of sales over successive 
years. For the purposes of this model, changes in working capital are 
assumed to be included in the overall sales figures. They could, 
however, be treated separately.
• Startup expenses. Startup expenses may be divided into two types; 
actual expenses and foregone sales (e.g. due to the short term impact 
of a plant move on customers’ confidence about the company). The 
NPV of these costs could be incorporated by subtracting them 
directly from each year’s simulation of the cashflow.
5.6 Summ ary
This chapter began by describing how an existing Kodak case example of 
an overseas plant relocation decision was adapted to model a greenfield
134
investment decision. It then provided a detailed discussion of the computer 
model built to analyse potential investments, based upon the mathematics 
emd five step process described in the previous chapter. Chapter 6 that 
follows identifies potential policy instruments and uses this model to assess 
them.
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C hapter 6 
P oten tia l N ew  T ypes o f P olicy  
Instrum ents
This chapter applies the mathematical derivations in Chapter 4 and 
Appendix A to identify a new set of policy instruments, and uses the 
computer model described in Chapter 5 to test the most promising 
instrument. Chapter 7 that follows then incorporates the findings of this 
chapter into a set of recommendations, drawing on the broad themes in 
U.K. development policy identified in Chapter 2 amd the description of 
corporate investment decision making from Chapter 3.
6.1 D esigning N ew  Policy Instrum ents
Using the derivations outlined in the Chapter 4 and Appendix A, it is 
possible to identify four potential new types of financial instruments
136
(Table 6.1). These were developed by identifying all variables that impact 
the critical ratio, based upon the earlier derivations, and then constructing  
a policy instrument that affected each variable directly. Each instrument 
was then screened to determine that it had the desired effect and was 
attractive from a cost-benefit perspective.
The first three potential policy instruments can be identified from the 
variables in equation 4.5: cr, a  and r. The following three types of 
instruments would affect each of these variables directly:
• Volatility m inim isation instrum ent. The first and most 
promising type of instrument would be for a government to minimize 
the volatility of a key economic input, such as labour costs or 
manufactured parts costs (i.e. reducing a). Reducing the volatility 
has the effect of lowering the critical ratio, thereby reducing the 
amount of additional investment required to push it over the hurdle 
and shortening the mean time to investment. This can be seen from 
equation 4.5, since reducing a leads to a larger ^  and therefore to a 
snialler critical ratio.
•  T rend ad justm ent instrum ent. A second type of instrument 
would require the development agency to offset the trend in a key 
input variable (i.e. reducing a). For example, if labour costs were 
rising steadily in real terms, the development agency could agree to 
offset this increase for a period of 10 years. Reducing a  in equation 4.5 
leads to a larger ^  and therefore to a smaller critical ratio.
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# Subsidized capital cost. A common approach used to simulate 
iuvestm ent by government agencies is to offer subsidized interest rates 
(i.e. reducing r). This has the effect of reducing the investing 
company’s cost of capital and therefore increasing the NPV. In 
traditional NPV analysis, this approach has the effect of increasing a 
company’s likelihood to invest. However, the analysis described here 
presents a counter-intuitive result. Reducing r in equation 4.5 reduces 
and therefore increases the critical ratio, thereby reducing a 
company’s propensity to invest. This simple analysis demonstrates 
that soft loan programs should actually have a dam pening  effect on 
investment when analysed with a sophisticated investment 
perspective; they will therefore not be considered further in this 
research. This result is confirmed by IngersoU and Ross (1988). They 
have shown that for long-lived projects, decreasing the interest rate 
does not necessarily accelerate investment. They also note that 
reducing a company’s interest rate reduces the cost of waiting, and 
therefore can have at best an ambiguous impact on investment.
The fourth potential type of instrument can be identified from 
equation 4.13. The three variables described above - a, cr, and r  - all 
appear in this equation, as does a fourth variable <f>, which can be used to 
model the actual or perceived likelihood of a pohcy shift.^ Reducing <j> in 
can also be used to model other types of external events, such as step changes in 
exchange rate (e.g. the U.K.’s departure from the ERM), or an oil price discontinuity. This 
thesis, however, is directed at the p o lic y  im p lica tion s  of option theory, and therefore
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equation 4.13 leads to a lower critical ratio (this may easily be seen by 
setting ^ to 0), and therefore reflects an increased likelihood for a company 
to invest. The fourth type of instrument would therefore seek to influence 
companies’ perceptions of the likelihood of different events. This is a 
somewhat different type of instrument than the three described above, and 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.4.
The following three sections describe each potential instrument in detail 
and identify their impact on the critical ratio for the Kodak investment 
decision. Where the proposed instrument is found to encourage appropriate 
behaviour, the appropriate section then computes the cost-beneflt tradeoff 
from the government’s perspective.
6.2 V olatility m inim isation (V M ) 
instrum ent
6.2.1 D escription  o f potentia l instrum ent
The objective of this instrument is to minimise volatility of key factor 
costs that cannot currently be hedged through traditional financial markets. 
These would include factor costs such as labour costs and parts costs; other 
costs such 35 commodity costs (e.g. oil, g2Ls) and interest costs can already 
be hedged cost effectively. As will be discussed below, the volatility of these 
costs can have a significant impact on a company’s propensity to invest.
will not address these types of events further.
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Table 6.2: Volatility minimisation policy instrument
Yezu: Labour index Unadjusted 
Labour cost 
(Pounds)
Payments 
Govt, to Co. 
(Pounds)
Payments 
Co. to Govt. 
(Pounds)
1995 100 10.0 0.0 0.0
1996 101 10.1 0.1 0.0
1997 102 10.2 0.2 0.0
1998 99 9.9 0.0 0.1
The proposed instrument relies upon risk sharing between government and 
investor, not unlike current government approaches to risk sharing used in 
tax loss carryforwards and carrybacks. The existence of a number of 
different ffneincial risk control approaches in the financial markets suggests 
that this type of approach would be attractive to companies.^
Table 6.2 shows how this instrument could work in practice. The 
government and investing company would begin by agreeing to a suitable 
index to measure labour cost (e.g. the CSO Quarterly Trend data). A 
baseline labour cost figure would also be agreed, in this case £10 MilHon. 
When the labour index rose above 100, it would reflect an increase in the 
average cost, and the government would reimburse the company
^Many countries (e.g. U.S., U.K.) allow companies to carry back current year operating 
losses in time, and therefore to claim refunds for taxes paid in the past. Tax losses not 
used to of&et past tax liabilities may then be carried into the future to offset future taxable 
earnings.
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appropriately (i.e. £0.1 million in 1996 and £0.2 million in 1997). If the 
index were to drop, as shown in the 1998 calendar year, the company would 
reimburse the government for the difference (£0.1 million). Note that by 
using this instrument, the company’s overall labour cost (i.e. unadjusted 
plus or minus any payments) remains at £ 1 0  million, despite any 
fluctuations in the labour index. ^
Although this example is shown on an annual basis, the scheme could be 
easily implemented on a quarterly basis. “Clawback” provisions parallel to 
those found in current Regional Selective Assistance programmes could also 
be imposed (Bachtler, 1990), to ensure that a company was not a net 
beneficiary of assistance for short term investments (i.e. if the company 
discontinued operations, it would be required to refund the benefits paid to 
the government).
The instrument as described assumes an inflation free environment. 
Implementing it in the real world would require adjustments so that it 
functioned as if it were in an inflation free environment. In other words, all 
payments would be based upon figures expressed in real (i.e. inflation free) 
terms. This conversion introduces the complexity that carryforwards are
^Further subtlety could eilso be incorporated into this instrument. The expected impeu:t 
of the labour index on the company’s actual cost structure could be negotiated. Companies 
vary considerably in the number of new employees hired eswdi year (which is likely to create 
a direct "pass through” of the labour market volatility), and are also influenced to a greater 
or lesser extent by the external labour market in determining how to pay their existing 
employees. The index used could also be tailored to the specific industry involved.
142
not usually indexed for inflation.
Majd and Myers (1987) have conducted work in a related area that 
provides an approach for resolving this issue. In their work, they analysed 
the impact of tax asymmetries on investment, and found that tax 
asymmetries can dramatically increase after-tax NPVs for high risk 
investments. They noted that carryforwards do not typically earn interest, 
which they must do in order to avoid the creation of an asymmetry. 
Importantly for this research, they proposed paying interest on tax, loss 
carryforwards as one of several mechanism to correct potential 
asymmetries. For the volatility minimisation instrument to work in 
practice, their approach or a similar one would need to be taken. 
Conceptually, however, it would be straightforward to pay interest on 
carryforwards based upon published economic data.
An additional important issue is whether this policy instrument creates 
any credit risk for the government. In fact, the instrument does create a 
modest credit risk, since it is possible that any given company will go 
bankrupt at a time when the government has paid a net subsidy up to that 
point (i.e. the payments over time have not balanced out to their expected 
average of 0 ) /  Two factors minimize the importance of this effect, however. 
The first is that any financial incentive paid to an investing company creates 
some risk to the government, and governments have shown themselves
^Of course, it is equally possible that the reverse may occur, i.e. the government has 
been the net beneficiary.
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willing to bear this risk. Only in cases of spectacular default is the general 
public even aware of the subsidy (e.g. the Delorean venture). The second is 
that the cost here will be lower than paying an outright subsidy, since this 
instrument seeks only to reduce the volatility of the costs. This instrument 
should therefore be at least as attractive to regional policy makers and the 
public as traditional instruments based directly on subsidies.
6.2.2 B aseline figures
Having described the proposed policy instrument in detail, it is now 
possible to use the investment model to identify the impact of the 
instrument on a company’s investment decision. This analysis assumes an 
initial investment cost I  of £60 million. Table 6.3 shows the critical ratio 
and investment threshold for ten simulations plus an average value across 
the simulations, prior to any government intervention. Each simulation 
reflects one potential investment decision.®
For each simulation, a criticad ratio was computed, based upon the 
average of 100 trials. Next, the investment threshold was computed by 
multiplying the assumed initial investment cost of £60 million by the
®To clarify terms used in the simulations, a hierarchy of terms was created. At the 
bottom were the individual “trials”. These are the individual runs of the model that 
are averaged to produce estimates for a  and <r. To produce these averages, 100 trials 
were combined into a “suite o f trials.” A single sim ulation represented one potential 
investment decision, i.e. included average parameter values based upon this “suite of 
trials”, plus one forecast of the “actual” behaviour of the investment.
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critical ratio C*. The fourth and fifth columns show the value of the 
investment computed in year 0 and the time the com pany would invest 
with no government investment. The year in which the company would 
invest can be identified from the simulation runs; this is the point at which 
the value stream crosses the threshold value (as shown earlier in 
Exhibit 4.1). A simple linear interpolation was used to identify the point at 
which the value stream crossed the investment threshold line. The last 
three columns show the level of government subsidy required to stimulate 
immediate investment and the net a and a  of the overall simulation. The 
cost for the government to stimulate the investment in year 0 is computed 
by subtracting the initial valuation from the investment threshold.
The average critical ratio across the ten simulations was 2.08, leading to 
an average investment threshold of 124.7. The average value of the 
investment in year 0 was 104.9. For each simulation, this figure was 
computed by simulating a cashflow stream plus terminal vadue. This initial 
value plus the computed average a and <7 were used to simulate a path for 
the value of the investment over time. In four of the ten simulations, the 
company did not invest over the ten year period. This is despite the fant 
that the naive analysis suggested that immediate investment was 
appropriate (since in all cases the year 0 value exceeded the initial 
investment cost of £60 million). In the other six cases, the average time to 
investment was 2.2 years. The average cost to stimulate investment was 
£19.8 million.
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6.2.3  C ost benefit analysis
A similar analysis may be performed with the volatility minimisation 
instrument in place, to identify the impact on a company’s likelihood to 
invest (Table 6.4). In this case, the government guarantees that (Jiabour = 0 
and (Tnon-iabour — 0. This guarantee lowers the critical ratio (from an 
average of 2.08 to an average of 1.93), leading to a lower threshold value 
(115.7 vs. 124.7). The average cost of subsidy incurred for each simulation 
is shown; note that the average is a negative number, i.e. (6.3). In other 
words, in the simulations shown, the government would achieve a net 
benefit by putting these measures in place. Simple theory would predict 
that this number be 0 ; however, the treatment of bankruptcy in this model 
has some impact on this average. The model is structured such that if the 
initial net present value of a sample path simulation is negative, it is 
excluded from the trial. Negative sample paths are more likely to result 
from individual cases where one or more of the labour or non-labour costs 
increases substantially (leading to a net negative profit in some year). 
However, it is precisely these cases in which the government wiU on average 
pay a higher level of subsidy. Excluding them therefore slightly skews the 
result toward a negative number, i.e. a benefit to the government. 
Offsetting this potential benefit would be the government’s costs of funds in 
cases where it had a net outflow of funds to different investing companies.
T h e governm ent’s intervention in the investm ent decision leads to two 
positive benefits. First, for companies that do invest within 10 years, it
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shortens the average time to investment from 2.2 years to 1.8 years. If 
companies that do not invest within 10 years are arbitrarily assumed to 
invest at the 10 yeai mark, the resulting average time to investment is 5.3 
years; putting the instrument in place reduces the mean time to investment 
to 5.1 years. Second, the average additional incentive required by the 
government to simulate immediate investment drops from £19.8 million to 
£8.9 million.
As noted above, the average cost of providing this incentive to the 
investing company is £-6.3 million across the ten trials. It is useful to 
assess the theoretical cost as well. Since the labour cost variable is assumed 
to be a geometric Brownian motion with drift, the expected variation due 
to a  is zero, but the actual variation can be significant. The government 
has a unique advantage, however. While a company may make a significant 
investment only every 5-10 years in a particular market, a development 
agency routinely oversees these investments. The agency is therefore able to 
reset the baseline used every year. Suppose one year the index rises. The 
agency may then need to subsidize a number of investments. In the 
following year, however, the agency will set the baseline at the higher value. 
Since there is an equal probability that the index will rise or fall in the 
third and subsequent years, it will then have the opportunity to recoup its 
payments. As a result, its average cost will be zero.
Table 6.5 shows how this hedging could work in practice. Suppose the 
government launches the VM instrument in 1996, when the Labour Cost
149
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Index (LCI) is a t 1.00, and that Investor 1 plans an annual expenditure on 
labour of £100 Million. Suppose also that the government and investor 
agree that the LCI index will be set at 1.00. If in 1997 the index rises to 
1.02, the government will owe a subsidy of £2.0 Million to the first investor. 
Note that this is the LCI with any underlying trend removed; this 
instrument is designed only to minimise uncertainty due to volatiHty. By 
analogy with the discussion in Section 6.2.1, the subsidies also need to be 
ad just^  for inflation.
Suppose a second investor with identical characteristics invests in 1997, 
but the government now agrees with the second investor that the LCI starts 
at 1.02 . Then in 1998, if the LCI rises to 1.03, the government will owe a 
total of £4.0 million in subsidies; £3.0 million to the first investor 
(100 X (1.03 — 1.00)) and £1.0 million to the second investor 
(100 X (1.03 — 1.02)). Note that the total level of subsidy has increaaed, but 
less than if the LCI for the second investor were set at 1.00. If a third 
investor enters the picture in 1998 and the LCI rises to 1.05 in 1999, the 
total subsidy becomes £10.0 Million, split between the three investors.
In the year 2000, the government sees the first benefit of its ability to 
hedge its total subsidy cost across investments. Suppose a fourth company 
enters in 1999, and the LCI agreed is 1.05. Suppose also that the LCI 
declines to 1.02 (Geometric Brownian motion with drift removed has equal 
probabilities of rising or falling). Then the government pays out £2.0 
million to investor 1, but receives back a total of £4.0 million from
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investors 3 and 4. Given a large pool of investments, the government . 
subsidy level should average out to 0. Over time, the net subsidy to even a 
single investment should be 0, but a long run of increases in the LCI could 
lead to politically unpalatable results (i.e. perceptions of excessive 
payments to particular companies).
6.2.4 C osts and selectivity o f V M  instrum ent
Section 2.6 used a simple framework to illustrate the cost and selectivity 
of different types of incentives. Figure 6.1 arrays the new volatility 
minimisation instrument on the original Figure (i.e. Figure 2.7). As can be 
seen, the cost of the instrument is lower than many traditional instruments. 
The government can therefore implement anything from a highly selective 
policy to a highly broad policy without incurring significant expenditure.
6.3 Trend adjustment instrum ent
6.3.1 D escription  o f potential instrum ent
A second type of new policy instrument would adjust investment risk 
associated with real changes in key inputs (e.g. parts costs), once the 
underlying volatility had been removed. To implement this instrument, a 
development agency would begin by agreeing to a figure for the historic 
annual trend (a) and a base level for a key factor cost, in this case labour 
cost. The government would then subsidise the labour cost by that amount 
each year, independent of the actual index (which would show a type
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volatility as well). Periodically, the actual trend for the period would be 
calcu lated , and any financial adjustm ents made to ensure that the 
payments reflect that true trend, not the original estimated one. Note that 
by talcing this approach, the development agency has reduced otiahour to 
zero, which has a signiflcant impact on the critical ratio.
An example of this suggested instrument would be as follows. Suppose 
that a company has labour expenditure of jClOO Million per year, and that 
the historical increase in real labour rates has been 2 %. Then in the first 
year, the government would pay a subsidy of £2  million (i.e.
(100 X 1.02) — 100), a subsidy in the second year of i?4.04 Million (i.e.
(100 X (1 +  .02)^) -  100), and so on. To avoid paying out indefinitely, the 
government and the investing company would agree to a particular period 
of years for which the subsidy would be paid. Naturally, were the 
government to implement this approach, it would need to compute that the 
benefits were sufficient to justify the costs and to agree to a time limit for 
the subsidy.
6.3.2 Cost benefit analysis
Although this instrument is conceptually simple to establish, it has a 
counterintuitive result that makes it inappropriate to implement. Referring 
to Figure 6.2, we see the impact on C* of changes in a, for three different 
levels of <7. In each case, increasing a  leads to increasing C*. However, this 
a refers to the net profit trend of the proposed business. The trend
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adjustment instrument described above would level the trend in expenses 
associated with the business. Reducing these expenses increases the profit 
over time, i.e. leads to higher overall a  and therefore an increase in the 
investment threshold. In other words, providing this apparently sensible 
incentive would actually reduce the attractiveness of the investment. Only 
by charging a p rem ium  on labour or non-labour costs in the future could a 
government make this incentive work on an economic basis; however, from a 
policy perspective this is not a viable option. The counter-intuitive nature 
of this result is similar to the analysis conducted above on the impact of 
reducing the company’s cost of capital, r, as noted above. It is also 
consistent with some of the findings in the literature noted in Section 1.5.
6.4 M inim ising future policy uncertainties
A third opportunity for government intervention is in the area of 
reducing future policy uncertainties. This type of potential policy 
instrument is of a different character than the two described above. Here 
option pricing can provide insights into two areas:
• From a com pany perspective, it allows us to quantify the impact of 
policy uncertainty on the critical ratio.
• From a governm ent perspective, it allows us to:
-  Identify certain aspects of optim al policy for different 
government parties, given fixed policy parameters related to 
investment policy (e.g. level of subsidy, approach to minimum
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wage). These pohcy aspects can be identified for each party in 
both an incumbent and an opposition role.
-  Demonstrate how divergence of policy between political parties 
can have a major impact on critical ratios, and therefore on a 
company’s likelihood to invest.
6.4.1 Case exam ples
As a first step in analysing the impact of uncertainty on the critical ratio, 
I developed two simple scenarios, which can be combined and “inverted” 
(i.e. the possibility of a tax reduction can be inverted into the possibility of 
a tax increase). For these cases, recall that the variable A reflects the 
probability of an event affecting the value of the investment. The variable <f> 
reflects the percentage change in value of the investment if the event takes 
place. The two cases analysed were as follows:
Case 1 : Change in Tax R ate. The first simulation modeled the effect 
of a 10% chance of a change in corporate tax rate from 33.25% to 36%. 
Since the post-tax NPV equals the pre-tax NPV times the tax rate, <j> can 
be determined without any approximation; cash generated by the 
investment decreases in direct proportion to the change in tax rate. The 
value for A follows directly from the statement of the case. Computing <f> is 
easy, since <f> will be the ratio of the difference in after-tax value divided by 
the original after-tax value, i.e.
33.25 X pre-tax value — 36 x pre-tax value _  —2.75 __
33.25 X pre-tax value 33.25
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C ase 2 : C hange in labour costs. The second simulation models the 
impact of a 5% chance of an increase in labour costs due to the imposition 
of a new minimum wage. Although A follows directly from the definition of 
the case, 4> requires a little more analysis. Assume that the imposition of a 
minimum wage results in an increase of 2% in total labour costs. Assume 
that we are modeling an investment in a labour intensive industry, i.e. 
labour costs represent 55% of total costs with a profit margin of 10%. The 
labour index in the simulation therefore increases from 55 in the base year 
to 56.1, and the base year net profit declines from 10 to 8.9 on an index 
value basis. The change in 0 can therefore be approximated as:
6.4.2  D escription  o f m odel
Figure 6.3 shows a printout of the model used to simulate the impact of 
different uncertainties on C*. The model is based upon equation 4.13 and 
the method described at the end of section A.3. It has four major parts, as 
follows:
• In p u t param eters . These include the cost of capital, r, the 
potential volatility of the investment, <7, and the trend of the 
investment, a . The figures used for a and a  are the average values 
across the ten simulations shown in Table 6.3. The variable S is 
calculated as r — a.
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• Uncertain elements. The model can accommodate two potential 
random events, and could easily be extended to many more. For each 
random event, A and ÿ are specified, corresponding to the probability 
of the event taking place and the impact on the value of the 
investment, respectively. If it is desired to model only one random 
event in a given simulation, the appropriate A may be set to 0.
• Iterative variables and supporting macro. The model uses a 
seed value and iterates until the error is very small (i.e. 1.0 x 10 “ )• 
The spreadsheet macro shown at the bottom of the page automates
this process.
• Output values. There are two key outputs of this model. The first 
is the new critical ratio, reflecting the uncertainty about the future. 
The second is the critical ratio without any uncertainty (i.e., with
both As set to 0).
6.4.3 R esu lts o f sim ulations
Using the scenarios and the above model, the numerical approximation 
approach described in equation 4.13 was used to determine the change m 
C ' and therefore the increase in investment threshold for a total of eight 
examples. As noted earlier, the average <7 and average a  from ten 
simulations in Table 6.3 were used to compute the critical ratio used m 
these examples. Table 6.4 summarizes the results. All of these examples 
assumed that the required level of investment, 7, was il60 Million.
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The results for each of the eight examples are as follows:
• C ase 1 . A possible increase in the corporate tax rate lowers the 
critical ratio from 2.04 to 1.90. This reflects a company’s increased 
interest in investing today if it feels that there is a possibility of a tax 
increase in the future (in order to secure the beneflts of the project 
when the tax rates are lower). By investing today, it foregoes the 
opportunity to learn more about the future; however, the income 
stream available at a lower tax rate more than compensates for this 
foregone opportunity.
• C ase 2 . A possible decrease in the tax rate has the reverse effect, 
raising the threshold from 2.04 to 2.26.
• Cases 3 and  4. In case 3, a possible increase in labour costs has a 
similar stimulating effect as a possible negative change in the 
corporate tax rate did in case 1. In case 4, the possibility of a 
reduction in labour costs tends to delay investment today.
• Case 5 . This case combines the effect of two potential negative 
events, i.e. cases 1 and 3. The critical ratio decreases by nearly 
exactly the sum of the decreases from the individual cases, resulting 
in a sharply lower critical ratio (and correspondingly stronger 
motivation to invest today).
• Cases 6  and  7. These two cases combine the possibility of one 
positive and one negative event. The net impact on the critical ratio 
depends on which event has a larger impact on the critical ratio in
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isolation. In these cases, the possibility of an increase in the corporate 
tax rate dominates.
• Case 8 . The final case combines the possibility of two positive events. 
In this case, the change in critical ratio is somewhat larger than the 
sum of the impact from the two in isolation. For example, if there are 
multiple uncertainties in connection with a change of government, and 
the business community feels that they wiU all be positive, it will have 
a depressive effect on investment in the short term. This “loads the 
dice” strongly against an incumbent government with even slightly 
less “business oriented” policies than the opposition. In this case, the 
possibilities reflected were a small increase in the tax rate and a 
moderate effect from the imposition of a new minimum wage.
It is important to note that these results apply equally to changes 
resulting from a change of government or a policy shift by the incumbent 
government. While the former type of uncertainty is an inevitable 
byproduct of a democratic society, the latter is under the direct control of 
the incumbent party. Managing this potential source of uncertainty should 
be a priority for all political parties. As Aizenman and Marion (1991) have 
noted, “The new wisdom is that it may not be enough to set macroeconomic 
policies at the ‘right’ levels. Uncertainty about the future course of policies 
should also be minimized.” The large impact of small probabilities of 
adverse events on the critical ratio reinforces their finding of the need for 
any government to minimize uncertainty about its own course of policies. It
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also underscores the potential detrimental impact of opposition party 
attacks on the susta inab ility  o f current policies. This result is confirmed 
in Pindyck (1991) who notes "... if a goal of macroeconomic policy is to 
stimulate investment, stability and credibility may be more important than 
the particular levels of taoc rates or interest rates.”
Using the model, two additional sets of analyses were conducted. The 
first examined the impact of increased likelihood of the adverse events 
described in the two cases above (i.e. a potential tax increase or a potential 
labour cost increase). Figure 6.5 summarizes the results. As expected, 
increasing A lowers the critical ratio, increasing a company’s likelihood to 
invest in the short term. This is because as the probability of an adverse 
effect increases, a company will seek to maximize its returns today to gain 
the benefits of the higher short term profits.
A second set of analyses sought to validate and quantify the impact of 
policy divergence as noted by several authors and discussed in Section 1.5. 
Here the probability of an adverse event was kept constant, but the 
expected magnitude of the event (the variable <j>) was varied between 0% of 
the total value and 40% of the total value. As expected, and predicted by 
other research, the criticad ratio decreased somewhat with increasing <j> (See 
Figure 6 .6). This is because ais potential future events become more 
onerous, a company will be more motivated to invest today.
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While this result is important on its own, there is also a “multiplier 
effect” that amplifies it. Since the critical ratio is multiplied by the 
investment cost to determine the threshold level, a small change in the 
critical ratio can lead to a large increase in the absolute dollairs required to 
stimulate investment. E a government is trying to “make up the difference” 
(see for example Table 6.3), a small shift in C* can have a significant 
impact on the investment promotion budget.
6.4.4 M odeling different FDI policies
In order to distil the policy implications from this mathematical approach,
I have applied the above logic to government policy on inward investment. 
In doing so, I have simplified the real world considerably. Going forward, it 
will be assumed that there are only two parties, a strongly free market 
oriented party ( “Free market” party) cind a party which gives greater 
priority to social concerns (“Social contract” party); the existence of a third 
party will not be considered. It will also be assumed that the tax rate 
under a “Social contract” government will be slightly higher than under a 
“Free market” government.®
^It will not escape the reader that these party descriptions bear some relation to the two 
largest political pairties in the U.K. The models presented here, however, are a sufficient 
abstraction from reality that to identify them as real parties would not do justice to the 
range of concerns either party considers. Nonetheless, even this simple abstraction from 
reality produces some important insights about FDI policy and its communication in a 
democracy, as will be seen below.
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The analysis that follows is consistent in light of different assumptions.
So long as the “Social contract” government’s spending priorities result in 
even a small additional cost to the investing company (e.g. through 
increase in the level of the minimum wage, higher VAT leaxiing to decreased 
sales, etc.), the policy prescriptions made below hold true.
6.4.5 O ptim al policy strategies for incum bent and  
opposition  parties
Figure 6.7 summarizes optimal actions for both incumbent and 
opposition parties, assuming that the policies of a “Social contract” 
government results in at least slightly lower corporate profits. The analysis 
assumes that each party has broadly fixed investment policies based upon 
the assumptions made above, but nonetheless wishes to optimize its own 
position. A government in opposition is assumed to benefit politically from 
a lower level of investment, in that it gains a political advemtage relative to 
the incumbent. An incumbent government is assumed to benefit from a 
high level of current investment. In reality, of course, the actual situation is 
more complex, but these assumptions will be made in order to model the 
situation and to gain insight. It should also be noted that each party is 
assumed to have equal “self-interest” in this respect.
This analysis yields a number of conclusions, some intuitive and 
consistent with current practices, and some not. Specific conclusions for 
each situation are as follows:
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tlH
• Incum bent “Free m arket” governm ent. The incumbent “Free 
market” party should seek to capitalize on its slightly more business 
oriented policies (e.g. companies are more hkely to invest if the tax 
rate is lower). It can do this in two ways:
— The first action is to encourage balanced discussion of the 
“Social contract” party’s policy approach. The key word here is 
balanced: acrimonious debate is unnecessary cind is hkely to 
weaken the credibility of the “Free market” party. This step 
reinforces companies’ desire to invest today.
— The second action is to avoid m aking guaran tees ab o u t th e  
future. IronicaUy, suggesting that current policies will remain 
forever, or even signing agreements on specific incentives for a 
future date, has a strongly depressive effect on investment (by 
removing or reducing the risk of an investing company created 
by waiting to learn more about market conditions in the future). 
This is not an intuitively obvious result, but an important one.
• O pposition “Free m arket” party. The “Free market” party in 
opposition will have an advantage relative to incumbent “Social 
contreict” party, in that some potential investors may wait until a 
change of government to reap the benefits of a more beneficial 
business climate. This advantage holds true only if opposition party 
claims eure credible (credibility is important, because it is the 
perceived likelihood of events that will influence a company’s 
hkelihood to invest). The “Free market” party in opposition can take
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two specific actions to maximize its effectiveness:
-  The first action is to a ttem p t to  build  awareness of 
im proved fu tu re  opportun ities under the “Free market” 
party’s government. This is a typical behaviour, but will be 
successful only if its claims are credible.
-  The second action is to suggest th a t  th e  policies of th e  
“Social co n trac t” p a rty  are likely to  change. This creates 
further uncertainty about the future, depressing a company’s 
likelihood to invest today (e.g. through increasing the a  of the 
overall investment and thereby increasing the critical ratio).
This approach is not generally followed today. Rodrik’s (1990) 
studies on major structural reform in developing countries has 
confirmed this principle. He notes, “rational behavior by the 
private sector calls for withholding investment until much of the 
residual uncertainty regarding the eventual success of the reform 
is eliminated.” This finding applies to the U.K.: firms will 
strongly and appropriately prefer to have uncertainty regarding 
policy reversals resolved before making significant investments. 
Either opposition party has the potential to hmit short term 
investment levels by challenging the sustainability of current 
policies of the incumbent government (while recognising that 
this is clearly not in the country’s best interests).
•  Incum ben t “Social con trac t” party. As noted earlier, an
incumbent “Social contract” party faces a disadvantage, in that some
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companies will conduct an analysis similar to the one discussed in 
Section 6.4.1 and conclude that they should wait until a change of 
government before making additional investments to reap the benefit 
of slightly lower tax rates (this analysis holds equally for domestic 
and foreign investing companies). Assuming that the “Social 
contract” party seeks to maximize investment in the short term to 
create job opportunities, it should take two actions:
-  A ttack  credibility of “Free m arket” p a rty  prom ises to
improve financial pohcies for investors. This is a staudard 
approach, and relies (correctly) on the result that if companies 
are persuaded that the benefits of a different government axe 
likely to be smaller than expected, a significant deterrent to 
investing today can be avoided. A similar line of reasoning ‘ 
applies if uncertainty can be created over the p robab ility  of 
improvements to the general business climate.
-  M atch  “Free m arket” party  incentives in ta rg e tte d  
industries. This is not often followed in practice, but could be 
very effective. By removing the uncertainty about the future, the 
“Social contract” government “levels the playing field” in specific 
industries without doing violence to its overall policy.
• O pposition “Social con trac t” party. On the margin, either party 
in opposition will benefit from delays in investment (i.e. because it 
will be able to suggest that its policies were directly responsible for 
the new investment when it is made later). The “Social contract”
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party in opposition should therefore suggest that the “Free market” 
party’s policies are unsustainable (e.g. because of budget constraints, 
demographic trends). Since it will not be obvious how the policies will 
change, it will tend to increase the uncertainty about the future, and 
therefore increase the critical ratio. It is important to note that this is 
a subtle but important departure from a popular approach of 
attacking the policies directly (e.g. on grounds of effectiveness, 
fairness, fit with European policies).
6.5 Sum m ary and conclusions
This chapter has drawn upon the mathematical analysis and the Kodak 
model developed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, to identify and screen a 
potential new set of policy instruments. It has identified one instrument, 
the Volatility Minimisation (VM) instrument, which has a strongly 
encouraging effect on investment levels and can be implemented at low cost 
to the government. It has also identified a number of behavioural 
implications for both Incumbent and Opposition political parties related to 
minimising future policy uncertainties.
Chapter 7 that follows identifies the final policy recommendations. It 
draws some general conclusions and presents detailed action steps to 
implement the VM instrument on a pilot basis, It also compares the VM 
instrument with recent investment pohcy approaches to assess it for 
reasonableness. Lastly, it provides a few insights into the implications of
173
this analysis on corporate investment decision making.
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C hapter 7 
Sum m ary and Im plications for 
D evelopm ent Policy
7.1 Summary o f m ethodology
This thesis has drawn together several disparate areas of research to identify 
new policy levers to promote inward investment. It began by reviewing the 
U.K.’s regional pohcy objectives in Chapter 2 and typical approaches to 
corporate decision making in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provided a brief 
summary of net present value anadysis (the most popular methodology for 
corporate investment decision making), and showed how this approach 
could be improved by applying research findings by McDonald and Siegel 
(1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In Chapter 5, this thesis described 
the cfeation of an analytical model based upon fieldwork with Kodak and 
the mathematical approach described in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 6 then drew upon these analyses to identify a comprehensive set 
of policy levers to stimulate inward investment and developed a potential 
pohcy instrument for each. Each of the four potential instruments was 
screened for its encouragement of the desired behaviour (i.e., the pohcy 
instrument should encourage more rapid investment, or it should reduce the 
level of subsidy required). The first instrument - minimising the volatihty 
of key inputs - was found to encourage the desired behaviour on the part of 
the investing firm and to be extremely cost effective to administer. A second 
instrument - controlling the uncertednty created by pohcy pronouncements 
by the incumbent and opposition governments - wais not a policy 
instrument in the same sense as the other three, but nonetheless provided 
some important insights into the optimal behaviour of incumbent and 
opposition parties. The remaining two potential instruments - providing 
soft loans and minimising the risk of a real increase in key elements of a 
company’s cost structure - were found to encourage the opposite 
behaviour of what was intended, and therefore were not considered further.
The remainder of this chapter identifies a set of recommendations to 
investment policy makers. In particular, it suggests adoption of the 
Volatility Minimisation (VM) instrument described in Chapter 6 . To check 
that the VM instrument is consistent with recent themes in U.K. 
investment policy, this chapter assesses the coherence of the proposed 
instrument with the key regional and investment policy issues identified in 
Chapter 2. It also makes some additional recommendations regarding 
investment policy pronouncements by the incumbent and opposition
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parties. It concludes with a few recommendations for corporate investment 
decision makers that result from this analysis.
7.2 Recom m endations for U .K . inward 
investm ent policy
Baaed upon the research in this thesis, development agencies should 
undertake a number of specific initiatives (see Figure 7.1 for a summary). 
The specific initiatives are as follows:
• Refocus m indset of developm ent agencies tow ards 
m inim ising investor uncertain ty . After years of regarding their 
role as facilitating foreign investment through “sweeteners”, it will 
require a significant mindset change for these agencies to recognise 
and exploit the role that uncertainty plays in investment decision 
making. This recommendation could be implemented in parallel with 
encouraging stronger DTI support for investment in general. The 
1992 Coopers & Lybrand study found that “although companies were 
not specific about the nature of the support they required, publicity, 
long term investment and training were the most common subjects of 
requests for action by the DTI in the future.”
• P ilo t volatility m inim isation instrum ents, developed nationally 
and negotiated locally. Drawing upon this research, pilot schemes in 
one or more regions should be launched. These should aim to 
implement a volatility minimisation approach for one or two
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mid-sized companies in two or three regions. It would then be 
possible to leverage the experience from these pilots to develop a 
national roll-out plan.
• Build centralized consultancy un it to advise regions and 
development agencies on the hkely costs and benefits of volatility 
minimisation incentives in local negotiations. Given the specialized 
nature of the expertise required and the relatively high cost of the 
required employees, this unit should be centrally located and made 
available on a consultancy basis to the pilot scheme.
• A im  for substitu tion  of gran ts/fiscal aid by vo latility  
guaran tees wherever possible. Given the low cost of implementing 
VM instruments, as shown in Section 6.2.3, there may be significant 
opportunity to replace expensive subsidies with factor cost volatihty 
and pohcy uncertainty guarantees. Soft loans, in particular, should 
gradually be phased out as a pohcy instrument, given their tendency 
to delay, rather than accelerate, investment when properly analysed 
(See Section 6 .1).
• Regional development agencies to  u p d a te  advertising  to
emphasise pohcy and economic stabihty of individual regions and the 
U.K. as a whole. These agencies (i.e. the Invest in Britain Bureau, 
Welsh Development Authority and Scottish Enterprise) often 
emphasise the underlying attractiveness of cu rren t costs and 
economic factors. Focusing instead on the U.K.’s relative stabihty
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over the medium to long term will actually have a greater impact in 
accelerating inward investment.
•  Po litical parties should m inim ise attacks on th e
susta inab ility  of opponent’s policies. Given the potential for damage 
to the national interest of attacks by one party on the sustainabihty 
of the policies of the others, it is important that the parties form a 
tacit or explicit agreement not to attack one another in this way.
7.3 Coherence of volatility m inim isation  
instrum ent w ith recent policy
This section compares the consistency of the recommendation to implement 
a volatility minimisation instrument with the five major types of 
conclusions summarized at the end of Chapter 2. The types of conclusions 
were general regional policy objectives, investment policy objectives, 
investment policy instrument emphasis, approach to investment incentives 
and approach to avoiding excess competition for investment. This section 
concludes with a brief discussion of the volatility based instrument in 
relation to the old Regional Employment Premium (REP).
7.3.1 G eneral regional policy objectives
The summary at the end of Chapter 2 identified several long-standing 
themes in regional policy objectives. These were the continuing need for
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regional intervention, the long-standing belief by both parties that inward 
iuvestm ent should be encouraged and the governm ent’s willingness to  
experiment with innovative approaches. There was also a fourth theme of 
traditional emphasis on automatic aid that was not hkely to continue. Of 
these, three are most relevant to the implementation of a volatility based 
pohcy instrument:
E ncouragem ent of inward investm ent. The U.K. has adopted a very 
encouraging stance, in particular with respect to Japanese investment (see 
for example. Strange, 1993). Implementing the volatihty minimisation 
instrument described here would support the U.K.’s encouraging stance, 
but at very low cost.
W illingness to  experim ent w ith innovative approaches. The U.K. 
has shown wilhngness in the past to experiment with novel approaches, 
which suggests that it is not unreasonable to imagine that it might adopt 
this new pohcy instrument.
A utom atic  versus discretionary aid. The low cost of the volatihty 
based instrument suggests that it may be offered on an automatic basis. 
Pfeffermann’s (1992) brief survey of recommendations to stimulate 
investment encourages emphasis on automatic aid, since discretionary aid 
“wastes time, adds uncertainty and invites corruption.”
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7.3.2 Investm ent policy objectives
The summary at the end of Chapter 2 noted that primary job creation and 
capital investment were the two most important objectives, followed by 
stimulus for domestic industry, secondary job creation, encouraging 
particular industries and encouraging the eventual transfer of other 
corporate functions. The volatility minimisation instrument would 
stimulate investment equally in capital intensive and humam intensive 
industries (although the exact guarantees agreed between the company and 
the government would reflect the people or capital intensivity of the 
business), and therefore would be consistent with recent pohcy objectives.
7.3.3 F it w ith  policy instrum ent em phasis
Chapter 2 concluded that in the area of pohcy instrument emphasis to 
encourage investment, the government has given primary emphasis to 
financial incentives, foUowed by decentrahsation of government offices, 
creation of regional development agencies, regional allocation of public 
investment and government orders, and infrastructure aids. Disincentives 
have not been used effectively since 1981 as a pohcy lever. Implementing 
the volatihty minimisation instrument would follow the government’s 
traditional emphasis on financial incentives.
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7.3.4 Approach to  investm ent incentives
As noted at the end of Chapter 2 , some broad generalisations may be 
drawn about the type of incentives preferred by the government in recent 
years. These include emphasis of grants over tax incentives or labour 
subsidies, introduction of broader support to businesses (e.g. provision of 
consultancy services), limited appHcation of industrial policy, and equal 
treatment of inward and domestic investment. It was also noted that local 
authorities have a significant role in influencing local investment decision 
making. The chapter also discussed the relative cost and selectivity of 
particular incentives. It concluded that the ideal instrument would be low 
cost to administer, but leave some flexibility in how selectively the 
government chose to adopt it. All of these issues are relevant to the 
implementation of the volatihty minimisation instrument, as foUows:
G ran ts  vs. fiscal aid or labour subsidies. Many authors have noted 
the inherent attractiveness of labour subsidies relative to investment gremts 
(e.g. Brech and Sharp, 1984, Vanhove and Klaasen, 1986). The 
implementation of volatihty minimisation based instruments follows this 
preferred approach of providing subsidies to labour, but at a far lower cost 
than some of the approaches used in the past (e.g. the Regional 
Employment Premium).
Provision of consultancy services. While the government’s 
consultancy services have traditionadly been more strategic or operations 
focused, the analysis required to negotiate the details of the volatility
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minimisation instrument will generate a perspective on the risks faced by 
the investing enterprise. This analysis has significimt value, over and above 
the benefits provided through making the VM instrument available.
L im ited application  of industria l policy (i.e. ta rg e tin g  of 
p a rticu la r industries). Given the very low cost to éidminister the 
instrument, it is not necessary to be selective in its implementation. The 
government can therefore continue its approach of giving limited emphasis 
to industrial policy.
E qual trea tm e n t of inward and  dom estic investm ent. Since aid to 
industry is usually considered a fixed dollar “pie”, aid to domestic versus 
inward investment is generally regarded as a “zero sum game” (i.e. 
assisting one company requires reducing potential assistance to another). 
Volatility-based instruments are low cost to implement, and therefore there 
is little need to discriminate between these two sources of investment. 
Pfeffermann (1992) recommends treating foreign investors equally with 
domestic ones, to avoid being unfair to national entrepreneurs and to avoid 
encouraging questionable joint ventures (e.g. ones where local parties are 
sought only to qualify for incentives).
Regional versus local decision m aking. Individuals with the skills 
required to support adoption of the VM instrument (e.g. mathematical 
economists) are relatively expensive, and therefore should be centrally 
located and managed to avoid duphcation across different regions. The
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actual negotiations, however, will require detailed knowledge of local 
conditions, and therefore should be conducted at a local level. This balance 
of regional and local authority is consistent with recent history.
Selective incentives versus broad based incentives. The low cost 
of the volatility minimisation instrument (i.e. administration only) suggests 
that it may be offered broadly. Figure 6.1 from the previous chapter shows 
that this instrument is on the ideal part of the cost/ selectiveness matrix. It 
is very low cost, and can therefore be applied as selectively or 
comprehensively as desired.
7.3.5 Im pact on com peting for investm ent
Section 2.7 provided a brief summary of the EC caps on investment 
incentives, in the very nairrow context of how these caps were intended to 
prevent destructive competition for investment between regions. The 
volatility minimisation instrument can easily be implemented in cdl regions; 
indeed, its low administration cost and stimulating effect on investment 
suggests that it should be widely adopted. Its adoption raises the 
possibility that the VM instrument might encourage even greater 
competition between regions and countries for investment.
Two important factors mitigate this tendency, however. Since the 
negotiations are conducted based upon local conditions, it will be more 
diflScult to make explicit comparisons between one region and another. This 
tends to “decommoditise” the investment decision, which works to the
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benefits of all regions. Second, for a company to consider a site seriously 
where VM instruments are available, it must make considerable effort to 
understand the local region and to model the economics. This in turn 
requires an investment of scarce internal skills, limiting the number of sites 
that be considered. Despite these mitigating factors, the potential for 
bidding for investment continues, and therefore the U.K. should continue to 
support the concept of EC limits.
7.3.6 Com parison w ith  R egional Econom ic Prem ium
The proposed VM instrument captures a number of the benefits of the REP, 
but at far lower cost. Section 2.5.3 identified seven benefits of the REP:
1 . It provided a local labour cost advantage.
2 . It avoided the capital orientation of many investment programmes.
3 . It did not discriminate against existing firms.
4 . It gave special encouragement to labour intensive types of industry.
5 . It cut regional production costs (like a regional devaluation).
6 . It minimised the spreading of effects to other regions.
7 . It incorporated an income transfer from rich to poor regions.
The new instrument does not provide a local labour cost advantage 
(benefit 1), but does stimulate investment in the regions where it is in
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place. It can be used equally well in capital or people intensive industries, 
and therefore provides benefits 2 and 4. As conceived, it does discriminate 
against existing firms (benefit 3) - although the approach could be extended 
to existing firms in depressed regions. It does not cut regional production 
costs directly or build in an income transfer (benefits 5 and 7), but it does 
minimise spreading effects to other regions (benefit 6 ), so long as the 
government controls its application.
While the volatility minimisation instrument does not provide all of the 
benefits of the REP, it does provide a number of important benefits at very 
low cost.
7.4 P otential im pact on corporate decision  
making
While making recommendations for company decision makers is not the 
focus of this thesis, it is possible to identify a few top level conclusions (see 
the right hand side of Figure 7.1). These include:
• Build capabilities in the  Finance organization to  analyse 
investm ents under uncertain  conditions. At any given point in 
time, corporations are using a wide variety of approaches to analyse 
potential investments (See, for example, Schall et, al, 1978, Klammer, 
1972). The general trend over the last 50 years, however, has been for 
companies to adopt increasingly sophisticated approaches (e.g. from
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simple payback calculations to sophisticated Net Present Value 
analyses). For companies to adopt the new type of thinking described 
here is the next logical step in this progression. Given the potential 
importance of uncertainty based analytical tools in making good 
investment decisions, companies should accelerate any existing efforts 
to develop the required skills. They should adso ensure that their 
decision making approach is as “rational” as possible, given some of 
the pitfalls described in Chapter 3.
• N egotia te  incentives m ore aggressively based on “new ” 
th inking . There is no reason why companies cannot take the lead 
with development agencies in seeking to apply the volatility 
minimisation based approach. The government should be more 
receptive to this approach than requests for further subsidies or tax 
incentives, given the low cost to implement the program.
• Im prove the  analysis of cross-site com parisons to fully reflect 
the volatility and uncertainty of each location. Companies need to 
apply the analytical approaches described in this thesis to each major 
investment decision, to ensure that the timing of the investment 
yields the optimal results. This will require much greater focus in site 
selection; traditionally, companies have been able to consider a large 
number of sites by “playing off” one particular region against another. 
In the new world, a company will require more detailed analysis to 
consider any site (e.g. to understand local factor cost trends in 
detail), and therefore will need to consider fewer sites. This should
188
lead to a better balance of power between investor and receiving 
location; the main beneficiary will be the receiving region.
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A p p en d ix  A  
M athem atical Formulas and  
D erivations
This appendix describes and extends slightly work set forth by McDonald 
and Siegel (1986) and discussed further in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The 
mathematical notation used follows the latter source. Section A.l sets out 
some notation on Brownian motion and Wiener processes. Section A.2 
re-derives the optimal investment point for a single stochastic variable. 
Section A.3 re-derives the investment decision rule for a single Poisson 
process. Section A.4 extends this analysis to multiple dimensions and states 
the general rule for combined stochastic auid Poisson processes. Section A.5 
describes the algorithm used for generating random numbers with a normal 
distribution.
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A .l  Analytical background
This analysis will rely heavily upon functions that describe Geometric 
Brownian motion with drift. A typical exogenous variable such as interest 
rates can be modeled using equations in the form:
dx =  axdt + (Txdz  ^ (A.l)
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process. In other words, dz =  Ct\/5î, 
where e* has zero mean and standard deviation of 1 . Then S(dz) =  0, a 
result that we will use frequently in this analysis. In equation A .l, <7 refers 
to the volatility of the variable and a  the increase (or decrease) over time.
If the current state of the variable is included (e.g. today’s interest rate), 
then these two parameters can be used to predict future values.
Ito’s Lemma, otherwise known as the fundamental theorem of stochastic 
calculus, provides a way to differentiate functions involving Wiener 
processes. If we generalize the expression for dx in equation A.l, we have:
dx =  a(x, t)dt -f 6(ar, t)dz (A.2)
If we assume that F{x,t) is at least twice differentiable in x, and once in
t, then Ito’s Lemma may be stated as follows:
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A.2 M cD onald Siegel analysis for single  
stochastic processes
McDonald and Siegel (1986) considered the question of when it is 
optimal to invest a sunk cost /  in a project V  whose value varies according 
to the following stochastic process^:
dV  =  aVdt + aVdz  (A.4)
Note that this may also be formulated equivalently as:
d(ln V) = adt +  adz
Our goal is to maximize the difference between the value of the difference 
between F{Vi) and / ,  where t is the time at which the exercise is taken. In 
particular, we want to find the critical value V* which ensures that jP(V^ ) 
will be the maximum. Because the time value of money means that the 
same dollar of return will be worth less in the future than it is today, we 
can turn this requirement into the following equation:
f ( F )  =  m ax f  [(Vr -  ,
where S  denotes expectation, T  is the time at which the investment is 
made, and r is the discount rate.
^The actual problem considered allowed 1 to vary stochastically as well, but for sim­
plicity I  is considered to be constant in real terms
193
Now, since the only return an investor meikes before the investment I  is 
made is capital appreciation, the expected value of dF  must equal this 
return:
rF{V)dt =  S{dF) (A.5)
In this equation, r represents the company’s required real (i.e. inflation 
adjusted) rate of return. To solve it, we first we expand dF using Ito’s 
lemma (equation A.3):
We can then simplify equation A.6 by noting that since F (y )  is not a 
function of f, ^ d t  =  0. Thus, dF  can be written:
Next, we substitute equation A.4 for dV into equation A.7, and compute 
the expected value
S{dF) =  S{F'{V)aVdt-\-F'{V)(7Vdz
+ +  2aaV^dtdz +  a^V^dz^^}
It is now possible to simplify this expression. E{F'{V)(7Vdz) = 0 and 
S{2a<rV^dtdz) = 0, since €{dz) =  0. We can also eliminate the term 
a^V^dt^^ since it goes to 0 (compare the original derivation of Ito’s lemma).
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Having eliminated these terms, we are now left with
S{dF) =  e{F '{V )aV dt +  ^F "{V yV ^dz'^}  
Noting that S{dz^) =  dt and using equation A.5, we can write:
rF{V)dt = a V F '(V )d t+ y^V ^F "{V )d t  (A.8)
Collecting terms we have:
K r‘V '^F "(y )-^a V F '{V )-rF {V ) = Q (A.9)
This differential equation can be solved by equations of the type:
F(V) =  A iV * + A 2V *, (A.IO)
where /% > 0 and jdj < 0. In addition, F(V) must satisfy three boundary 
conditions:
F (0 ) =  0 , (A .ll)
F (F ') =  V - / , (A.12)
F '(V ) =  1. (A.13)
Note that although equation A.9 is second order, there are three 
boundary conditions. Equation A. 11 can be derived by noting that if V in 
equation A.4 ever goes to 0, it will remain there. The second two boundciry 
conditions include the variable V*, which is the value of V  at which it is
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optimal to invest. Equation A.12 is known as the ‘value matching’ 
condition, and it merely states that the firm receives a payoff ofV * — !  
when it invests. Equation A.13 is the ‘smooth pasting’ requirement. Its 
derivation is technical, but details may be found in Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994).
It is now possible to solve equation A.IO subject to the boundary#
conditions. Boundary condition A .ll requires that A2 = 0. For the 
remadnder of this analysis, we will therefore rename vairiable as p. By 
substituting the equation
F{V) =  AV^ . (A.14)
in equations A.12 and A.13, we find that
V  =  (A.15)
and that
Using the terminology of chapter 1 of the text, C* =
We can now solve for p. Substituting equation A.14 into equation A.9, 
we have
-  V)AV^-'‘ +  qV ^AV ^-^  -  rAV^ = 0
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Dividing through by AV^ and multiplying by 2, we can write
-1 ) 4 -  2aP — 2r = 0
Then
2
0 0^ ^ +  2 (a  — — 2r  = 0
So the positive root of this equation is
2 <7
a  1
2
4— T > 0 (A.17)
Note that a firm would never want to invest if < 0, since the value of 
F (V )  would always decrease over time. Equations A.14, A.15 and A.16 
provide the parameters required to specify the solutions for V* and F{V).
A .3 Single Poisson processes
We can extend the analysis of the previous section to include processes that 
have a component that varies continuously over time, but can also take a 
fixed jump with probability A. We can define this Poisson process in a 
similar way to the Wiener process as follows:
, f 0 with probability 1 — Adf, . /A io\
^ ^ = [ u  with probability Xdt
Then we can write stochastic functions that include Poisson elements as 
follows:
dx =  a{x, t)dt +  b{x, t)dz +  g(x, t)dq 
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In general, if H  = H{x, <), then E(dH) can be found by using Ito’s lemma 
for combined Brownian and Poisson processes, i.e.:
^(dH) =  ^  4- dt (A.19)
+ £;i{A[H(x + g (x ,t)u ,t)-H (x ,t)]}d t,
where the expectation is with respect to the size of the jump. In our 
specific case, we have:
dV = a V d t-{■ <rVdz-\-Vdq
In other words, a(x,t) =  a  and 6(x,t) =  <r. In addition, since F{V) is not a 
function of f, ^  =  0. Restating equation A.5 for the appreciation an 
investor makes before investing, we have:
rF{V)dt =  E(dF) (A.20)
Then using the expanded Ito’s lemma and the above equation, we have:
rF{V)dt =  aV F '(V )dt +  ^-(^V ^F \V )dt -  A (F(V) -  F[(l -  dt
Here we have made an important limiting assumption that if a Poisson 
event occurs, the value of V  falls (or rises) by a fixed percentage where 
0 <  < 1- Then, collecting terms we have:
h j^ V ‘F"{V) +  aV F'(V ) -  (r +  A)F(V) +  AF[(1 -  <^ )V] =  0
We can again choose a solution of the form given in equation A.14. 
Substituting this form into the above equation we can write
i(7 /^3()0 — 1) -f — (r -1- A) -H A(1 — ÿ)^ = 0 
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A solution to this equation may be found numerically. One way to 
accomplish this is to use a seed value of 1 for /5, and then to increase P by 
—1 times the value of expression on the left hand of the above equation. 
This process may be repeated until the error falls below an arbitrarily small 
value. Once P has been found, V* and A  can then be found as well by 
using equations A.15 and A.16. The model described in Section 6.3.3 relies 
upon this approximation technique.
A .4 M ultiple Poisson processes
We can extend the derivation for single Poisson processes to situations in 
which there are two Poisson processes. In this case, dx is given as follows:
dx = fl(x, t)dt + 6(x, t)dz + 5'i(x, t)dqi +  ^2(2:, f)dç2 (A.21)
Then in general for a function H  =  H(x^ f), we have:
^(dH) = ^
+ {Ai[H(x +  gi(x, t)u i,t) -  Hfx, t)]}dt 
+  ^  tA2[H(x +  g2(x, t)u2, t) -  H(x, t)]}dt.
(A.22)
where the expectation in both cases is with respect to the size of the jump. 
In general, if x is a function of i Poisson processes, we have:
d^ H
+  E ,-^ {^ i[H (x - |-g i(x ,t )u i,t )-
^(dH) =  ^  + [a(x, O i r  +  i) dt
d(x,t)]}dt
(A .23)
Making the same limiting assumption as before, we can write:
dV  =  aVdt +  aVdz +  Vdqi 4- Vdq2 
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Using equation A.5, we can write:
rF{V) = aVF'{V)-\-\(7Y^F"{V)
-  XiF(V)-\-XiF\(l-(t>i)V
-  x2F{v ) + A2FK1 -  <^2)y;
Assuming F{V) = AV^ as before, we have:
—a^P{P  — 1) +  olP — (r -}- Ai +  A2 ) +  Ai(l — ^1)  ^+  A2 ( l  — ^2 )  ^ =  0
The generalized equation for multiple stochastic variables with several 
Poisson processes is therefore as follows:
—<7^ P{P — 1) 4- OiP — (r 4- Ai) 4" ^  Ai(l — <f>i)^  = ,0. (A.24)
^  i i
The same simple iterative numerical solution technique may be used as in
the previous section to find the positive root of /?.
A .5 Norm alized random numbers
The random number generator in the Lotus 123 Spreadsheet programme 
produces a uniform distribution of numbers between 0 and 1. 
Unfortunately, the Wiener processes described in section A.l rely upon 
random numbers with a normal distribution and with a mean of 0 and a c  
of 1. We can produce random numbers with a normal distribution for use 
in the computer model using the following methodology:
1. Let Di and D2 be uniformly distributed in the interval —1 to 1, and 
also be independently distributed. These numbers are readily available 
from the Lotus programme.
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2 . Let E  be defined a.s E = D\-\- D\.
3. Then if 0 < F  < 1, let F  be defined as follows:
4. Then if Gi = Di x F  and G\ = D\ x F , G\ and Gg will be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and <7 = 1. Page C-8 shows the calculations made 
in the model to ensure that the random numbers generated meet the 
required characteristics.
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A ppend ix  B
Industry  interview s
The locations and approximate dates of the interviews used to develop the 
five cases are as follows (slightly disguised to preserve confidentiality):
• G lobal pharm aceutical company. London, June-September, 1992
• L ight m anufacturing  company. New York State, January-May, 
1991
• G lobal consum er goods company. Paris and Amsterdam, 
January - March, 1993
• G lobal insurance brokerage. Atlanta, Georgia, August-December,
1994
• G lobal fragrance company. Paris and New York, March-April,
1995
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A ppendix C 
Sam ple O utput From  
Investm ent M odel
The following pages contain a printout of the investment model described 
in detail in Chapter 5.
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